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Notes
WHEN THE OPEN ROAD IS CLOSED TO
JUVENILES: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
JUVENILE CURFEW LAWS AND THE
INCONSISTENCIES AMONG THE COURTS
I.

INTRODUCION

[A]ll reasonablepeople believe that minors should not be
roaming the street at all hours of the night. Most reasonable
people would also agree that the state has a legitimate interest
in maintaininga curfewfor minorsfor their own health and
welfare, to aid parents in enforcing the rules set within the
family unit, as well as to minimize participationin illegal
and/or harmful activities that youths might be tempted to
undertake under the cover of darkness, such as vandalism or
worse. As laudable as these goals are, the promulgation of a
curfew law must also consider that certain things that youths
do in public places after the curfew hour are not only legal, but
also are strongly protected by the United States Constitution
from interference by the state.'
Hannah, a sixteen-year old high school sophomore, and her friends
were walking down the street at 12:15 a.m. on a Tuesday night when a
police officer stopped them for a curfew violation. 2 The city's curfew
ordinance required minors seventeen years of age and younger to be off
the street between the hours of eleven o'clock at night and six o'clock in
the morning from Sunday to Thursday and from twelve o'clock at night
to six o'clock in the morning on Friday and Saturday. The ordinance
was enacted to deter juveniles from committing crimes, to protect
children from becoming victims of crime, and to reinforce parental
authority. The ordinance included exceptions for the following: (1) First
Amendment activities, (2) interstate travel, (3) involvement in activities
with the consent or accompaniment by a parent or guardian, (4) persons

1

Hodgkins v. Goldsmith, No. IP99-1528-C-T/G, 2000 WL 892964, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 3,
2000).
2
This is a hypothetical created entirely by the author and contains fictitious names and
events. The words "juvenile," "minor," and "child" will be used interchangeably
throughout this Note to signal anyone who is under the majority age in his state, which is
generally eighteen years old.
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on direct route from employment or in the course of employment, (5)
persons on direct route home from any school or other civic organization
function, (6) persons on a reasonably necessary errand at the bequest of a
parent or guardian, and (7) persons involved in an emergency situation.
Violating the ordinance was a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine.
Hannah and her parents sued the city under the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to enjoin the city from enforcing the curfew
3
ordinance.
This is a typical scenario that arises out of juvenile curfew
ordinances. 4 These ordinances are a national phenomenon, plagued with
many constitutional issues and no clear solution. Because the Supreme
Court has provided no guidance on the constitutional implications of
curfew ordinances, lawsuits continue to trouble the courts. 5 Cases are
decided inconsistently, and legislators remain uncertain about how to
draft curfew ordinances. 6 Judges and legislators face conflicts between

3
Both minors and parents have been found to have standing in curfew litigation, even
though they may not have been arrested, fined, or threatened with either. Naprstek v. City
of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1976). It is enough that the ordinance prohibited
intended conduct and "had been applied to and enforced against persons under
circumstances identical to those in which the plaintiffs found themselves at the time of
bringing the action." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973).
4
See, e.g., Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Juvenile
Curfew Regulations, 83 A.L.R. 4th 1056 (1991).
Most of the litigation regarding juvenile curfew regulations has
focused on their validity(§ 3-23), and the success or failure of the
various challenges frequently depended upon the scope or clarity of
the particular curfew restrictions and the judicial analysis of the nature
or extent of a juvenile's due process, equal protection, or First
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution or similar
rights guaranteed under various state constitutions.
Id. at 1064.
5
Howard T. Matthews, Jr., Comment, Status Offenders: Our Children's Constitutional
Rights Versus What's Right for Them, 27 S.U. L. REV. 201, 207-08 (2000). "With as many cases
concerning the constitutionality of curfew ordinances that have entered the judicial system,
the lack of Supreme Court guidance has left the federal courts without any concrete
method of analysis." Id.; Bykofsky v. Borough of Middleton, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (denying certiorari to a case involving a constitutional
challenge to a juvenile curfew ordinance). In his dissent from the denial of a writ of
certiorari, Justice Marshall stated that, "[blecause I believe this case poses a substantial
constitutional question one which is of importance to thousands of towns with similar
ordinances I would grant a writ of certiorari." Bykofsky, 429 U.S. at 966. The Court has also
denied certiorari in other cases. See, e.g., Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843
(4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999).
6
See, e.g., Jill A. Lichtenbaum, Juvenile Curfews: Protectionor Regulation, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTs. 677, 686 (1998) (noting the inconsistent results over curfew ordinances due to the
different analyses undertaken by the courts).
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7
the rights of minors, citizen safety, public policy, and parental rights.
Several provisions of the Constitution and Bill of Rights are, therefore, at
8
issue-namely the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Although curfew ordinances come in a variety of forms, this Note
focuses on the most popular-nocturnal juvenile curfew ordinances. 9

See, e.g., William L. Foreman, Note, Constitutional Law: Hutchins v. District of
Columbia: The Constitutional Dilemma Over Juvenile Curfews, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 717, 717
(2000) (recognizing the dangerous situation that arises because judges are required to
balance the interests of a political community with the constitutional rights of individuals).
8
Craig Hemmens & Katherine Bennett, Out in the Street: Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Curfews
and the Constitution, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 267 (1998). "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. amend. IV.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id. amend. XIV, § 1. Fourth Amendment claims raise a number of other constitutional
issues, which are beyond the scope of this Note. See Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir.
1974).
9
Deidre E. Norton, Note, IAhy Criminalize Children? Looking Beyond the Express Policies
Driving Juvenile Curfew Legislation, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 185 (2000). Other
types of curfews include emergency, gender-based, race-based, and ethnicity-based. Id. at
185-91. Emergency curfews are implemented for a brief time period in order to promote
public safety. Id. at 185. They are usually enacted during natural disasters or social
protests. Id. They are consistently held to be "a proper exercise of police power to respond
to emergency situations with temporary curfews that might curtail the movement of
persons who otherwise would enjoy freedom from restriction." Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d
105 (11th Cir. 1996) (imposing a county curfew after a hurricane); see also MADISON, WI.,
CODE ch. 23, § 47(2)(b) (2000), http://livepublish.municode.com/20/lpext.dll/Infobase32/
1/3642/289d?f=altmain-nf.htm&q=curfew&x=Simple&2.0 (last visited Apr. 16, 2003).
(2) The emergency power of the Common Council ...includes the
general authority to order ... whatever is necessary and expedient for
the health, safety, welfare and good order of the city in the emergency
7

...includes.., the power to:

(b) Impose a curfew upon all or any portions of the City thereby
requiring all person in such designated curfew areas to remove
themselves forwith from the public streets, alleys, parks or other public
places.
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These curfews commonly order juveniles to be off the streets between
the hours of eleven o'clock at night and six o'clock in the morning.10 This
Note explores the validity of various juvenile curfew laws and proposes
a model ordinance that will withstand a constitutional challenge. In
doing so, Part II gives a broad background on juvenile rights, curfew
ordinances, and the theories of relief under which these claims are

MADISON, WI., CODE ch. 23, § 47(2)(b). See also Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F. Supp. 1109,
1115 (D.C. V.I. 1989) (upholding a curfew enacted in the wake of a hurricane). But see
Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1140 (D.D.C. 1989) (declaring curfew enacted to combat
drug and violence crisis to be unconstitutional and unenforceable).
Gender-based curfews are normally enacted to protect a woman's safety and restrict
her behavior. Norton, supra, at 185-86. For example, Eastern Kentucky University imposed
a curfew on female freshmen, and after their freshman year, women could only be
exempted from the curfew if they: "(1) maintained a 'C' average and remained free of
academic or social probation; (2) paid a fifteen dollar fee each semester; and (3) if they were
under twenty-one, obtained parental consent." Id. at 186. The curfew was challenged in
Robinson v. Board of Regents of Eastern Kentucky University, but the court upheld the curfew
despite the challenge. 475 F.2d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 1973).
Race-based curfews have been enforced by the United States itself and upheld by the
Supreme Court. Norton, supra, at 187. These curfews were based on fear and applied to
blacks in order to prohibit them from traveling during the nighttime when whites could
not observe them. Id. This type of blatant discrimination was present in the midnineteenth century. Id. The problem now is not that curfews are enacted in such a matter,
but rather that this discrimination is a motive in enacting curfew laws. Id. at 188.
A final type of curfew is one based on ethnicity, and the most famous of this kind was
enacted during World War II and was imposed on Japanese, alien Germans, and alien
Italians. Id. This generated the Hirabayashicases. Id. The importance of these cases is that
a law can be supported by valid policy concerns, while concealing invidious justifications,
which are extremely difficult to prove. Id. at 190-91. These (gender-based, race-based, and
ethnicity-based) other curfews "have a long and unpleasant history and have often been
motivated by emotions-distrust, disrespect, discrimination, and hate-that have no place in
lawmaking." Id. at 185.
10
See KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE § 50-237(a) (1998) ("It is unlawful for any minor under
the age of 18 years to loiter, wander, stroll or play.., at such places, . . . between the hours
). Most of the hours fall
of 11:00 p.m. on any day and 6:00 a.m. of the following day;.
within an hour later or an hour earlier. See, e.g., DENVER, COLO., CODE § 34-61(a)(1)a (2001)
(defining curfew hours as those hours between "11:00 p.m. on any Sunday, Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday until 5:00 a.m. the following day"). Others differ
depending on the age of the individual. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 395.20(a)(b)
(2001).
(a) For any person under fifteen (15) years of age the hours of
restriction are between 10:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m .....
(b) For any person who has attained the age of fifteen (15) years of
age and is under eighteen (18) years of age, the hours of restriction are
between 12:01 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. on the same day.
Id. In a poll of 800 cities done by the National League of Cities as a follow-up to a 1999
survey, fifty-five percent of the cities said the curfews extended one hour on the weekends.
Cities Say Curfews Help Reduce Gang Activity and Violent Crime, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 25, 2001,
2001 WL 28753463.
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brought." Part III analyzes these claims individually and critiques how
the courts have handled them in light of curfew ordinances. 12 Part IV
deals with the critical language of challenged ordinances in order to
propose a model ordinance that would withstand even an application of
strict scrutiny. 13 Finally, Part V provides a brief conclusion regarding the
14
validity of curfew ordinances.
II.

BACKGROUND

This Part reviews the foundation and history of juvenile curfew law
in the United States. A review of the inconsistencies and reasoning of
the courts' decisions is necessary to understand the status of the law
today. Subpart A discusses the history of the treatment of juveniles in
the constitutional setting in order to justify the restrictions that curfews
place on minors.1 5 The next Subpart examines the underpinnings of
16
curfew legislation and why cities and states began enacting them.
Following the discussion on why curfew ordinances are enacted, the
decisions of the federal circuit courts are examined. 17 Finally, the third
Subpart scrutinizes the theories under which claims are brought by
18
plaintiffs in curfew litigation.
A.

The History of Juvenile Rights
"[C]hildren do not fail to make decisions and plans on matters
that they know about. What we really think of them is not
that they cannot make decisions but rather that they are
incapable of making good ones."19

There are two basic issues that are necessary to the discussion of
juvenile constitutional rights. 20 The first concern is the conflict between

11

18

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

19

LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEIR BEsT INTEREST?

12
13

14
15

16
17

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

I.
III.
IV.
V.
II.A.
1I.B.1.
II.B.2.
II.C.
THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL RIGHTS FOR

CHILDREN 21 (1992) (citation omitted).
20
See, e.g., Gregory Z. Chen, Note, Youth Curfews and the Trilogy of Parent, Child and State
Relations, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 133 (1997) (discussing the history of the fundamental right
of parents to guide the upbringing of their children). The analysis must include the
custodial role that a parent plays and should balance the interests of the state with the
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the parents' right to guide the upbringing of their children and the
The
government's right to regulate the conduct of children.21
government's ability to regulate children stems from the power of the
state as parens patriae.22 This doctrine imposes a duty on states to protect
the welfare of children. 23 Under this doctrine, states are authorized to
intervene in the relationship between the parent and the child in certain
situations. 24 Such intervention is warranted where there is some
compelling interest at stake.25 Courts have found that protecting the
community from crime, deterring juveniles from committing crime, and
protecting juveniles from becoming victims of crime are all compelling
governmental interests. 26 A juvenile's liberty interest may, therefore,

minor's rights. Id. The starting point should be an examination of the relationships among
the state, minors, and parents. Id.
21
Frank J. Kopecky, Introduction to Juvenile Justice, J. Juv. L. & PRAC. § 1.5 (2001). "It is
difficult to draw the line between the state's duty to protect children and the parents'
'liberty' right under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their children as they see fit." Id.
This conflict has been ensuing for over 100 years. Id. The more recent analysis has been
termed as -"family privacy and parental control as opposed to state intervention and
protection of children." Id. (citations omitted). The court has also taken a more traditional
role in determining when this theory is appropriate. Id.; see also DAVID ARCHARD,
CHILDREN: RIGHTS & CHILDHOOD 111 (1993) (recognizing that it is in the best interest of the
child to be reared by its parents but that certain situations warrant the intervention of the
state).
22
"[Latin 'parent of the country'] The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its
capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999). "The concept of parens patriae developed in medieval
times when the king provided wardship or shelter for orphaned children of lords and
barons." Kopecky, supra note 21, § 1.4. The doctrine is most often used when a person in
society is unable to take care of himself. Id. There is a presumption that the family will be
primarily responsible for the care of its children. Id. However, if the family is unable to
provide the needed care, the state may step in and do so. Id. This theory is the foundation
for much of the social welfare laws that states have in place today. Id. The theory was
thought to make its way into American law in the case of Ex part Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (E.D.
Pa. 1839). Id.
23 Ginsberg v. New York, 309 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (noting that the well-being of children
is within the power of the state to regulate); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction
of Adolescence, 29 HOFsTRA L. REV. 547, 551-52 (2000) (recognizing that parents do not have
absolute control over their children's lives because society has a stake in the healthy
development of children, and "it will bear the burden of parental failure to fulfill their
obligations").
24
Tracey B. Harding, Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: Reform is Needed, 39
BRANDEIS L.J. 895, 895 (2001) (discussing the power of the states to legislate subjects which
traditionally have been decided in the intimate relationship of parent and child).
2
Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia County, Ala., 880 F.2d 305, 312-13 (11th Cir. 1989)
(holding that there must not be interference with the family absent a compelling
justification).
26
See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (holding the protection of the
community from crime to be a compelling interest); Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d
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give way to the state's parens patriae power in order for the state to
27
preserve and promote the welfare of children.
The second issue is the extent and scope of rights that children
should enjoy under the Constitution. 28 The Supreme Court has
examined the rights of juveniles on a case-by-case basis. 29 This
methodology reflects the Court's view that the law should take special
31
care of children. 30 Initially, legal jurisprudence did not favor minors.
Although the concern for juvenile rights has advanced through the last
century to afford minors greater protection under the Constitution, it is
well established that the state's power to regulate the conduct of minors
is more expansive than its power to regulate the conduct of adults. 32 The

935, 947 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding the reduction of juvenile crime and juvenile victimization
to be compelling interests); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing
that the state interest in the well-being of its juveniles is compelling); Washington v. J.D.,
937 P.2d 630, 634 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that crime prevention and protecting
minors from being victimized are compelling interests).
See J.D., 937 P.2d at 633 (noting that in order to provide minors additional protection,
27
the state can curtail their freedom, even "at the expense of their full constitutional rights").
28
See Chen, supra note 20, at 131-32 (discussing the shift in the approach to minors'
rights from focusing on the conflicts between the state and the parent, to conflicts between
the state and the minor, and finally to separating the interest of the parent and the minor).
29
Charles W. Gerdes, Note, Juvenile Curfew Challenges in the Federal Courts: A
ConstitutionalConundrum Over the (Less Than) FundamentalRights of Minors, 11 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 395, 400 (1999); see also Chen, supra note 20, at 139 (noting that the Court has applied
"general legal principles and theories ... without establishing a structured framework for
minors' rights").
30
See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
31
Harding supra note 24, at 895. There was a strong presumption that children are
dependent persons who are not competent to make decisions about their own interests. Id.
at 903; see also ARCHARD, supra note 21, at 47 (claiming that the law treats children worse
than adults "not simply by denying them these rights, but by imposing extra burdens upon
them").
32
Gerdes, supranote 29, at 400-01; see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Certain decisions are considered by the State to be outside the scope of
a minor's ability to act in his own best interest or in the interest of the
public, citing statutes proscribing the sales of firearms and deadly
weapons to minors without parental consent, and other statutes
relating to minors' exposure to certain types of literature, the purchase
by pawnbrokers of property from minors, and the sale of cigarettes
and alcoholic beverages to minors.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72, 74 (1976) (holding that the constitutional
rights of minors do not "mature and come into being magically" when a minor becomes an
adult); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 n.23 (1967) (stating that the child "receives the worst of
both worlds" because he does not get the rights of adults nor the care and treatment of a
child); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (recognizing that just because a
state cannot prohibit an activity done by an adult "does not mean it cannot do so for
children").
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Supreme Court has frequently upheld laws as constitutional if they were
aimed at children, even though these same laws would be
unconstitutional if they had been aimed at adults. 33 The question then
becomes what rights are in fact afforded to children and what level of
scrutiny the Court should apply to alleged infringements of those
rights. 34
The Supreme Court has not been clear in its decisions regarding this
issue. 35 Some decisions explicitly state and protect the rights of children,
while others tend to reflect a more paternalistic view.36 For instance,

33 See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (recognizing the scope of the power of the state to
control the conduct of children as more expansive than its authority over adults); Prince,
321 U.S. at 168 ("The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like
actions of adults.
This is peculiarly true of public activities and in matters of
employment."). The Supreme Court was most clear when it stated:
[A]t least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual
choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It
is only upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may
deprive children of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the
right to vote-deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable
for adults.
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649-50 (footnote omitted).
34 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion). In regard to many of
the constitutional claims brought by minors, the Supreme Court has found minors' rights
are "virtually coextensive with that of an adult." Id. For instance, the Court has held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to minors in juvenile
proceedings. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 378 (1970) (holding that juveniles can
only be found guilty upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13
(holding that minors have the right to adequate notice, the assistance of counsel, and the
opportunity to confront their accusers). The juvenile criminal justice system, however, is
distinguishable from the adult system, which assumes that juveniles constitutionally may
be treated differently. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635. Juveniles are not entitled to all of the
requirements of a criminal trial, which includes a trial by jury. Id. For a discussion on the
level of scrutiny to be applied, see infra Part II.B.2.
35

NANCY E. WALKER ET AL., CHILDREN'S RIGHT'S IN THE UNITED STATES: IN SEARCH OF A

NATIONAL POLICY 10 (1999). One reason asserted for judicial inconsistency on this issue is
the changing composition of the Supreme Court. Id. In the past twenty years, the
constituency of the Court has changed from predominantly liberal to predominantly
conservative. Id. Thus, the majority has been "unwilling to grant to minors those rights
routinely acknowledged for adults." Id. There are other differences between the justices
that may influence their decisions, including "their willingness to consider social science
findings to be 'evidence' [and] their knowledge of the stages of child development,
including the ability to make informed decisions." Id. at 11. "It has been said that 'the
development of children's rights began with the Warren Court' and advocates of selfdetermination rights were encouraged by such decisions as Tinker and In re Gault." Id. at
12.
36 Id. at 10; see also Scott, supra note 23, at 547.
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there are certain procedural rights that are afforded to children in a
criminal context such as adequate notice, the opportunity to confront
their accusers, and access to counsel. 37 Conversely, children are not
38
afforded the right to a jury trial, bail, or indictment by grand jury.
Today, there is a higher level of paternalism toward children, and courts
do not always use the highest level of scrutiny to analyze possible
39
burdens on their fundamental rights.
Many cases have addressed the issue regarding the scope of the
rights of minors, but the landmark case that states that juveniles are less
protected and can be regulated to a greater extent by the state is Bellotti v.
Baird.40 This case summarized the Supreme Court's decisions regarding
the constitutional rights of children. 41 The issue in the case was the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that required parental
consent before an abortion could be performed on a minor who was
42
unmarried, unless a court order issued on good cause was obtained.
The Court could not agree on a single rationale, but eight Justices agreed
43
that the statute was unconstitutional.
The plurality stated that the starting point for analysis in a case
dealing with the rights of minors is that the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Bill of Rights protect both children and adults. 44 Nevertheless, the
Court cautioned that these legal theories would be unsound if not

Paternalistic legal regulation of children is based on a
conventional understanding of childhood, an understanding that
conforms quite well to the developmental account of human capacities
in the early stages of life. Immature youths are assumed to be unable
to look out for themselves, and thus are in need of adult supervision
and guidance. Several interrelated dimensions of immaturity are
important in shaping legal policies that treat children differently from
adults. First, children are dependent on others ....
Children also lack
the capacity to make sound decisions.... Children's decision-making
also reflects immature judgment, which may lead them to make
choices that are harmful to their interests and the interests of
others.... [C]hildren are assumed to be malleable and thus vulnerable
to both influence and harm from others.
Scott, supra note 23, at 550-51 (footnotes omitted).
37 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1.
Id. at 22; see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 & n.2 (1966).
39

WALKER ET AL., supra note 35, at 12.

4
41
42
43
44

443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 634-35; see also Gerdes, supra note 29, at 402.
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 625.
Justice White penned the only dissenting opinion. Id. at 656 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 633-34.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2003], Art. 3

840

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.37

adjusted to fit the needs of children.45 Thus, the plurality held that
children's constitutional rights should not be equated with those of
adults and justified its conclusion with three reasons: "the peculiar
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
46
child rearing."
Courts continue to utilize these factors today to address situations
involving the rights of children.47 However, not all courts have used the
Bellotti factors in curfew cases. 48 The major debate about their use
centers on whether or not the factors should apply outside the abortion
context in which they were originally created. 49 Nevertheless, even in

Id. "[C]hildren have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal
theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically
transferred to determination of a State's duty towards children." Id. (citation omitted). The
Court also noted the importance of passing down values and morals on to our children. Id.
46
Id. at 634. The first factor, the peculiar vulnerability of children, is especially
important when analyzing situations where minors are deprived of liberty and property
interests. Gerdes, supra note 29,at 403. An example of the application of this factor is that
juveniles are given a separate criminal justice system and are not afforded the right to a
jury trial. Id. The most important implication of this factor is that "legal systems can
recognize and adjust for the unique liabilities of children in a given legislative scheme
without doing violence to the Constitution." Id. The next factor, the inability to make
critical decisions, is especially difficult to measure because the Supreme Court has not
defined the type of choices or decisions that are critical. Id. at 404. It is clear that states can
limit a child's decision-making capacity in situations where such decisions would have
serious consequences. Id. This is especially evident in the treatment of First Amendment
rights for minors. Id. at 405. Another example of a situation where a minor's decision
making is limited is the requirement that a parent consent before a minor can enter into a
marriage. Id. at 406-07. The final factor to be considered is the importance of the parental
role in child rearing. Id. at 407. The Supreme Court has identified the parental
constitutional right to guide the upbringing of their children in a number of cases. Id. at
408 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923)). However, the right is not absolute, and there are some situations where the state
may step in as parens patriae. Id.
47
Brian Privor, Dusk 'Til Dawn: Children'sRights and the Effectiveness of Juvenile Curfew
Ordinances,79 B.U. L. REV. 415, 429 (1999) (recognizing that courts have most often used the
Bellotti factors when dealing with the rights of minors).
48 See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 538-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(declining to apply the Bellotti factors); Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945 (9th
Cir. 1997) (applying the Bellotti factors); Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176, 184
(D.Conn. 1999) (same); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D.D.C. 1989) (same); see
also Adam Poff, Comment, A Tale of Two Curfews (And One City): What Do Two Washington
D.C. Juvenile Curfews Say About the ConstitutionalInterpretationsof District of Columbia Courts
and the Confusion Over Juvenile Curfews Everywhere?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 277, 298-99 (2001).
49
Poff, supra note 48, at 299. Courts and commentators who oppose using the Bellotti
factors in juvenile curfew cases look to the Court's own words in Bellotti, "'[tihe abortion
decision differs in important ways from other decisions that may be made during minority
45
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situations where courts do agree that the Bellotti factors should be
applied, the results are still inconsistent.50 To understand the application
of the Bellotti factors in the curfew context, it is important to examine the
history of curfew ordinances and the decisions in which they have been
analyzed, which is discussed in the following subpart.
B.

5

Curfew Ordinances'
In light of this nation's long relationshipwith juvenile
curfews, one would think that the related constitutionalissues
before so many American courts would have been resolved
long ago. After all, United States cities began implementing
juvenile curfews over a century ago. Nevertheless, the
constitutionalissues surroundingjuvenile curfews are
52
anything but well settled.

1.

History of the Ordinances

3
Curfew ordinances have been around since before the Civil War.5
4
They are generally examined under two opposing viewpoints5 First,

.... [T]here are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an important
decision will have consequences so grave and indelible.'" Id. (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at
642). Opponents also rely on the fact that only four Justices joined in the opinion in which
the factors were established. Id.
Advocates of the use of the factors also rely on the language of the case itself,
particularly that the "'status of minors under the law is unique in many respects.'" Id. at
300 (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633). They argue that the statement means the Court
intended for the factors to apply outside the abortion context. Id. However, the Court
failed to explicitly limit its decision to abortion cases and even relied on cases outside the
abortion context to establish the factors. Id. In forming the factors (i.e., the test), the Court
relied on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968),
Prince v. Massachusetts,321 U.S. 158 (1944), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 300 n.166.
50 Jeff Beaumont, Nunez and Beyond: An Examination of Nunez v. City of San Diego and
the Future of Nocturnal Juvenile Curfew Ordinances,19 J. Juv. L. 84, 103 (1998). In the context
of juvenile curfews, the Bellotti factors have been inconsistently applied. Id. Some
ordinances have been invalidated due to an application of the factors, and some have been
upheld. Id.
51 Curfew is defined as "the sounding of a bell at evening" or "a regulation enjoining the
withdrawal of usu. specified persons (as juveniles or military personnel) from the streets or
closing of business establishments or places of assembly at a state hour." MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 284 (10th ed. 1998).

52

Poff, supra note 48, at 277-78.

53

DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW:

DOCTRINE,

POLICY AND PRACTICE 1000 (2000). Even then, there were problems and constitutional
issues regarding the ordinances. Id. at 1000-01. They were initially used to control slaves
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some opponents contend that curfews infringe on the rights of minors
and parents, which make the ordinances unconstitutional. 55 Second,
they suggest that curfews do not adequately serve the interest for which
they are enacted. 56 Advocates assert that curfews do serve very
important purposes: the protection of juveniles from becoming the
victims of crime and the deterrence of juveniles from committing
crimes. 57 Since no national juvenile curfew law exists, cities and

or free blacks. Id. at 1000. At the end of the nineteenth century, they were directed solely
at juveniles. Id. The curfews got their greatest support when President Benjamin Harrison
called them the "most important municipal regulation for the protection of children of
American homes, from the vices of the street." Id. At the turn of the century, there were
about 3000 villages and municipalities that had a curfew law of some sort. Id.
54
Lichtenbaum, supra note 6, at 678 (noting the groups that form between parents,
children, lawmakers, and legislators and the division as to the constitutionality and
practicality of curfew ordinances); see also Brant K. Brown, Scrutinizing Juvenile Curfews:
Constitutional Standards & The Fundamental Rights of Juveniles & Parents, 53 VAND. L. REV.
653, 653 (2000) (noting that, "not surprisingly," two viewpoints arise surrounding curfew
laws).
55
Brown, supranote 54, at 653-54; Privor, supra note 47, at 427.
56
See Jason T. Ross, Mandatory Detention: The Fourth Circuit Upholds Charlottesville's
Juvenile Curfew Ordinance, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 835 (2000) (recognizing that some
studies show juvenile crime has increased, while others show it has not); David McDowall
et al., Juvenile Curfew Laws and Their Influence on Crime, 64 DEC. FED. PROB. 58 (2000). The
studies that are available do not conclude that curfews are ineffective. McDowall, et al.,
supra, at 62; see Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims:
1999
National Report
111
(1999),
http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/national
report99/toc.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2002). Studies done on juvenile crime do not "shed
much light on the problem of juvenile crime." Snyder & Sickmund, supra. There are a
number of reasons for the inconsistencies in juvenile crime rates, especially within the
primary source of information on juvenile arrests, which is the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting Program. Id. at 112. Some of the problems
include the following: (1) changes in arrest rates may be due to a greater willingness of
victims to come forward and report crimes and not that more crimes are being committed;
(2) crimes may be reported by the number of arrests that are made, not the number of
persons that are arrested; (3) normally only the most serious crime the individual
committed is reflected in the data; (4) only those crimes that have been "cleared" (i.e., an
arrest was made) are reported; and (5) officers have a great deal of discretion in arrest
procedures. Id. at 112-14.
57
See Privor, supra note 47, at 421. Crime rates have increased significantly, allowing for
wide public support of the curfews. Id. A poll by CBS news showed that of 2000 adult
respondents, eighty-seven percent of them approved an eleven o'clock weekday curfew;
fifty-three percent felt a nocturnal curfew would be very effective; and thirty percent
thought that the curfew would be somewhat effective. Id. In a poll of nearly 800 cities
done by the National League of Cities ("NLC"), "the overwhelming majority" said that the
curfews were effective in improving safety in a number of areas: "combating juvenile
crime (effectiveness reported by 97 percent of respondents), fighting truancy (96 percent of
respondents), making streets safer (95 percent of respondents), and reducing gang violence
(88 percent of respondents)." Cities Say Curfews Help Reduce Gang Activity and Violent Crime,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 25, 2001, 2000 WL 28754463. Among those cities polled that had
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municipalities across the United States have enacted their own curfew
ordinances. 58 They became increasingly popular in the 1990s due to an
increase in gang activity. 59 A study done in 1997 revealed that eighty

nighttime curfews, fifty-six percent reported a decrease in the amount of violent crime and
fifty-five percent reported a decrease in gang activities after only one year of the enactment
of the curfew. Id.
58 Norton, supra note 9, at 177. While only a few states have a state-wide curfew law,
most are enacted and governed by local governments pursuant to their police powers.
ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 53, at 1001. Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
New Hampshire, and Oregon have statewide curfew laws. Id. For instance, the statute in
Florida contains the following language:
(1)(a) A minor may not be or remain in a public place or
establishment between the hours or 11:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. of the
following day, Sunday through Thursday, except in the case of a legal
holiday,
(b) A minor may not be or remain in a public place or
establishment between the hours of 12:01 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.22(1)(a)-(b) (West 2002). In Hawaii, the statute prohibits:
Any child under sixteen years of age, who, except in case of
necessity, or except when permitted so to do in writing by a judge of
the family court, goes or remains on any public street, highway, public
place, or private place held open to the public after ten o'clock in the
evening and before four o'clock in the morning, unaccompanied by
either a parent or guardian or an adult person duly authorized by a
parent or guardian to accompany the child, is subject to adjudication
under section 571-11(2).
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577-16 (Michie 2001). Similarly in Indiana, there is a codified
curfew law that prohibits children fifteen through seventeen to be in a public place "(1)
between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. on Saturday or Sunday; (2) after 11 p.m. on Sunday, Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday; or (3) before 5 a.m. on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday, or Friday." IND. CODE ANN. § 31-37-3-2 (West 2002). Another provision limits
children less than fifteen years of age to be in a public place "after 11 p.m. or before 5 a.m.
on any day." Id. § 31-37-3-3. However, each of these states also has a provision that allows
for counties, cities, or towns to modify the curfew regulation. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 877.25 (allowing the county or municipality to adopt or incorporate the curfew or to
provide more or less stringent regulations); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577-21 (allowing
counties to create their own curfew ordinances which would supercede the statute); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-37-3-4 (allowing a city, town, or county to "advance the curfew time
within the jurisdiction of the city, town, or county by not more than two (2) hours").
59 Norton, supra note 9, at 176. President Clinton endorsed the enactment and
enforcement of curfews, particularly the one proposed in New Orleans. Wolf Blitzer,
Clinton Supports Curfews To Cut Youth Crime (May30,1996), http://www.cnn.com/
ALLPOLITICS/1996/news/9605/30/Clinton.curfew/index.shtmil
(last visited Mar. 17,
2003). He noted that "[tihey must also know that it's a dangerous world out there and
these rules are being set by people who love them and care about them and desperately
want them to have good lives." Id. In a related article, the President expressed his opinion
that such curfews are "designed to help people be better parents." ACLU Condemns
President's Curfew Policy (June 1, 1996), http://www.aclu.org/news/s060196c.html (last
visited Mar. 17, 2003).
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percent of cities with populations of over 100,000 had enacted curfew
laws within the past forty years. 60 Since 1990, at least ninety of these
cities have enacted a new curfew or modified an existing one.61 In
addition, the study showed that four out of five cities with populations
of over 30,000 had nighttime curfews. 62
Thus, it is clear that
63
communities everywhere embrace and enact curfew ordinances.
The language of the ordinances varies, but they generally share four
common features: "a blanket rule, exceptions to the rule, punishment for
64
violation of the rule, and a list of purposes for promulgating the rule."
In essence, curfew ordinances make it punishable for a juvenile to be
away from home at particular times of the evening. 65 Most jurisdictions
treat a violation as a status offense. 66 Other jurisdictions punish violators
with fines, community service, or just use the curfews as a means to get
minors off the streets.67 These ordinances also give rise to a host of

6
Privor, supra note 47, at 419 (citing the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice and Statistics, 102-07, tble. 1.114 (1996)).
61 United States Conference of Mayors, A Status Report on Youth Curfews in America's
Cities: A 347 City Survey 8 (1997), http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/news/publications/
curfew.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
62 Id.; see also Privor, supra note 47, at 419-20.
63 Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 8, at 269. Juvenile curfews are one of the most
popular methods used to combat juvenile crime. Id. at 323. "Juvenile curfews are not new,
but their current degree of popularity is unparalleled." Id.
6
Brown, supra note 54, at 656-57; see also Norton, supra note 9, at 175. Common
exceptions include emergencies, running errands for parents, school functions, religious,
government and civic events, and any activity as long as it is with a parent or guardian.
Brown, supranote 54, at 657.
6
Norton, supra note 9, at 177. "Juvenile curfew legislation creates status offenses by
criminalizing activities of minors that would be legal if undertaken by adults." Id. They
generally require "older minors" to be home between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.
Id. "Younger minors" have to be at home between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Id. Penalties
can include fines from fifty to thousands of dollars. Id. Some ordinances hold parents
liable for their children's behavior. Lichtenbaum, supra note 6, at 705.
6
Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 8, at 271. Status offenders are treated differently than
other offenders. Id. The Supreme Court has held that a state cannot criminalize status, but
"this does not apply to juveniles because their age serves to mitigate their responsibility
and requires the state to seek the 'best interests' of the child." Id. at 271 n.26; see also
Matthews, supranote 5, at 201. The status offender is a statutory creation that comes within
the court's jurisdiction for committing an act that would not be criminal had it been done
by an adult. Matthews, supra note 5, at 202.
67 Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 8, at 271. Some ordinances also include provisions
that punish the parent or business owner. See, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 497 (5th
Cir. 1993). The language of the ordinance in Qutb provided in part: "a parent or guardian
commits an offense if he knowingly permits, or by insufficient control allows, the minor to
remain in any public place or on the premises of any establishment within the city during
curfew hours" and "the owner, operator, or any employee of an establishment commits an
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issues, which relate to both the Constitution and public policy. 68
Legislatures have advanced similar public policy rationales in order to
support these curfew ordinances: a reduction in juvenile crime rates, a
reduction of the victimization of juveniles, and reinforcement of parental
authority. 69 The majority of the public has been deeply concerned over
the rise in juvenile crime and supports the implementation of these
curfews as a possible solution to the problem. 70
2.

Court Decisions

The first juvenile curfew case was heard in a Texas state court in
1898.71 The ordinance at issue was very broad, contained only two

offense if he knowingly allows a minor to remain upon the premises of the establishment
during curfew hours." Id. The National Conference of State Legislatures found that
"approximately half the states have amended existing laws or created new ones to apply to
the parents of curfew violators." Lichtenbaum, supra note 6, at 705. Some jurisdictions
require parents to undergo mandatory counseling with their children, partake in
community volunteer work, pay fines up to five hundred dollars, or spend up to fifteen
days in jail. Id. at 705-06.
68
ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supranote 53, at 1002-03. Public policy concerns include the need
to (1) assist parents in controlling their children; (2) compel parents to supervise their
children; (3) protect children from criminal violence by other juveniles; (4) regulate gang
activity; (5) protect society from the violence of juveniles; and (6) relieve juveniles from
peer pressures that produce criminality in children who are not otherwise prone to
criminal activity. Id. Opponents of juvenile curfew ordinances assert the following
criticisms: (1) curfews are an undesirable crutch for parents; (2) they violate parents'
prerogatives to control the upbringing of their children; (3) they have more of an effect on
law abiding juveniles; (4) they involve law abiding juveniles in the criminal justice system;
(5) they unfairly punish innocent youths for the crimes of a few; and (6) they waste good
police resources. Id.
69
Norton, supra note 9, at 175. These are the three most popular rationales that are put
forth by legislators. Id. An additional problem that is raised by those who oppose curfew
ordinances is that ulterior motives may be influencing legislators when they enact the laws.
Id. These other potential motives include the public's fear of juveniles, the desire to get
children off the streets, and the assistance that the curfews provide parents in the discipline
of their children. Id. However, courts have found the interest of a reduction of juvenile
crime and victimization as sufficient justification for the ordinances. Id.
70
See, e.g., Jason J. Bach, Comment, Students Without Rights: The Elimination of
Constitutionaland Civil Rights, As They Apply to Minors, 1 NEV. LAW. 19 (Jan. 2000). Media
attention has been focused on the violence of youths and society's inability to control them.
Id. Regaining control of our youth has become "a top priority, even if that means
elimination of fundamental Constitutional and civil rights that all other Americans enjoy."
Id.
71
Ex parte McCauer, 46 S.W. 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898). The initial complaint was from
a nineteen-year-old who was ticketed and detained for violating the ordinance. Id. at 936.
He filed by writ of habeas corpus, and the case was remanded by the county judge and was
then appealed. Id. The ordinance at issue made it unlawful for anyone under twenty-one
years old to be on the streets "15 minutes after ringing of what is called the 'curfew bell'
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exceptions, and was invalidated. 72 The court held that the ordinance
caused an undue invasion of a child's liberty interest and usurped the
parental function. 73 The first federal case to examine the constitutionality
of a nocturnal juvenile curfew ordinance was Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown.74 The court held that, with the exception of a few vague

provided for by the ordinance," which was nine o'clock in the evening. Id. at 937. The
ordinance exempted those who were accompanied by a parent or were in search of a
physician's services. Id. at 936.
72
Id. at 937.
73 Id. The court stated:
The rule laid down here is as rigid as under military law, and makes
the tolling of the curfew bell equivalent to the drum taps of the camp.
In our opinion, it is an undue invasion of the personal liberty of the
citizen, as the boy and girl (for it equally applies to both) have the
same rights of ingress and egress that citizens of mature years enjoy.
We regard this character of legislation as an attempt to usurp the
parental functions, and as unreasonable, and we therefore hold the
ordinance in question as illegal and void.
Id. The court held that the ordinance was unreasonable, paternalistic, and invasive of a
citizen's personal liberty. Id. The court also noted that there were not enough exceptions in
the ordinance and that they could think of a number of other situations where citizens
would reasonably need to be on the street (church, social gathering, errand, etc.). Id.
74 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Penn. 1975). This action was brought by Ms. Bykofsky, on
behalf of herself and her minor son, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, seeking a declaratory,
preliminary, and permanent judgment against the defendant, the Borough of Middletown.
Id. at 1246. The plaintiffs requested that the court find the ordinance unconstitutional and
enjoin the enforcement of the curfew. Id. In earlier proceedings, the court denied plaintiff's
request for a preliminary injunction and defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. The Borough
then decided to enact a new juvenile curfew ordinance that replaced the one in effect at the
time of the suit. Id. The complaint and pleadings were amended to allow the plaintiffs to
challenge the new ordinance in the present action. Id. Thus, the case before the court was
the plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment to hold the new ordinance unconstitutional.
Id. The ordinance prohibited minors from being on the street from ten o'clock or eleven
o'clock in the evening (it varied with age) to six o'clock in the morning unless they fit into
one of the curfew's exceptions. Id. The exceptions included the following: a minor
accompanied by a parent (legal guardian, person standing in loco parentis, or one who has
legal custody from a court order); a minor accompanied by a person authorized by the
parent to do so; a minor exercising First Amendment rights, as long as written notice was
given to the Mayor ahead of time; a minor in a case of reasonable necessity after a parent
has notified the police of the situation; a minor on the sidewalk of his home or of the next
door neighbor; a minor returning home (via a direct route) within thirty minutes of the end
of a school, religious, or voluntary activity if prior notice had been given to the police; a
minor has received a special permit from the Mayor; the minor is part of a group that is
authorized by the Mayor to be out after curfew hours; a minor has a certified card for
employment; a minor has parental consent to be in a motor vehicle for travel (travel within
Middletown not covered under the curfew); and a minor is seventeen years old and
excepted from the curfew by the Mayor. Id. at 1246-47. The ordinance also prohibited
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words and phrases, the ordinance was constitutional. 75 The court also
found that the ordinance did not violate any fundamental right of the
child or the parents. 76 Additionally, it noted that, since the conduct of
children can be regulated more than the conduct of adults, the curfew
was a proper exercise of the City's police power.7
The decision in
Bykofsky was appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, who
affirmed the lower court's decision. 78 The Supreme Court denied
79
certiorari.
Since Bykofsky, other federal circuits have approached challenges to
curfew ordinances in different ways. 80 For instance, in Hutchins v.

parents from "knowingly" allowing a child to violate the curfew. Id. at 1247. Finally, the
curfew set out the punishment procedure. Id.
75 Id. at 1266. The court found the word "normal" in the phrase "normal ...night-time
activities" to be unconstitutionally vague because the ordinance did not set forth any
guidelines as to what constituted normal activity. Id. at 1250. It also held that the phrase "a
minor well along the road to maturity" was unconstitutionally vague. Id. The problem
with both of these phrases is that they left too much discretion with the Mayor as to what
activity was permissible. Id. The court also held that the section that allowed the Mayor to
enact a regulation if "consistent with the public interest" was vague. Id. The phrases "a
sufficient degree of maturity" and "as an incentive to and recognition of approaching
maturity" were also vague. Id. at 1251. The ordinance had a severability provision which
allowed the court to delete the vague phrases without having to denote the entire
ordinance unconstitutional. Id. at 1250.
76 Id. at 1258. "The minor's interest in freedom of movement upon the streets ...is
clearly outweighed by the governmental interests which the ordinance furthers." Id. Also,
the court noted that the ordinance "is a constitutionally permissible regulation of the
minor's right to freedom of movement upon and use of the streets as guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Additionally, the ordinance did
not unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment rights or the right to travel of the
Borough's minors. Id. at 1260, 1262. Finally, the court also held that the ordinance did not
unconstitutionally infringe on the parents' right to guide the upbringing of their children.
Id. at 1262.
77 Id. at 1266.
78 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976). The decision was noted only in a table of "Decisions
Without Published Opinions." Id. Such tables only indicate the disposition of the case and
do not generally have value to any person other than the parties and the court. Id.
79 429 U.S. 964 (1976). The Court denied certiorari by a seven to two vote. Id. The denial
contained a strong dissent by Justices Marshall and Brennan. Id.
so
Calvin Massey, Juvenile Curfew and Fundamental Rights Methodology, 27 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 775, 775 (2000) (analyzing the decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits). Other state and federal district courts have heard curfew cases, but the results
have not been consistent either. See, e.g., Hodgkins ex rel Hodgkins v. Peterson, 175
F. Supp. 2d 1132 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (holding the ordinance to be constitutional); Hodgkins v.
Peterson, No. IP-00-141-C-T/G, 2000 WL 33128726 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2000) (holding the
Indianapolis curfew to be constitutional with the deletion of certain vague words and
phrases); Hodgkins v. Goldsmith, No. IP99-1528-C-T/G, 2000 WL 892964 (S.D. Ind. July 3,
2000) (holding the Indiana curfew to be overbroad in violation of the First Amendment);
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District of Columbia,81 the en banc court held, in a plurality opinion, that
the curfew survived strict scrutiny and did not violate the First or Fourth
Amendment rights of minors. 82 This particular curfew contained
numerous exceptions to its enforcement, including involvement in First
Amendment activities.8 3 The Second Circuit has heard one case on the
issue but did not decide the case on the merits, holding instead that the
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it contained no end
time. 84 The Fourth Circuit, in examining and upholding a curfew
ordinance as constitutional, applied intermediate scrutiny, reasoning
that minors deserved more protection than rational basis, but not the
85
most stringent level of protection.

Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176, 188 (D. Conn. 1999) (holding the ordinance
to be constitutional in light of equal protection, vagueness, and Fourteenth Amendment
due process claims); Moorhead v. Farreily, 723 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.V.I. 1989) (holding
that plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief regarding the emergency curfew due to
lack of probable success on the merits); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1140 (D.D.C.
1989) (holding the temporary curfew to be unconstitutional); McCollester v. City of Keene,
586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984) (holding the ordinance to be overbroad on its face
and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); In re Spagnoletti, 702
N.E.2d 917, 920 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding the ordinance to be unconstitutionally
overbroad because the curfew restricted too much activity); Sale v. Goldman, 539 S.E.2d
446 (Va. 2000) (holding the ordinance to be constitutional because no fundamental rights
were burdened by the ordinance); City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329, 338-39 (Wis.
1988) (holding that the ordinance passed constitutional muster even though the
fundamental rights of juveniles were impinged upon by the ordinance).
81 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (plurality opinion). For a complete discussion of the
Hutchins decision, see Benjamin C. Sasse, Note, Curfew Laws, Freedom of Movement, and the
Rights of Juveniles, 50 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 681 (1997).
82 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 531. The plurality felt that the curfew did not implicate any
fundamental rights of the minors or their parents. Id. However, even had such rights been
violated, the court held that the ordinance would have withstood strict scrutiny. Id.
83 Id. at 535. The curfew contained eight defenses to its enforcement which included the
following: if a minor is (1) accompanied by a parent or guardian, (2) on an errand, (3) in a
vehicle for the purpose of interstate travel, (4) occupied in employment activity or travel to
and from employment, (5) involved in an emergency, (6) on the sidewalk "that abuts the
minor's or the next-door neighbor's residence," (7) at an "official school, religious, or other
recreational activity sponsored by the District of Columbia, a civic organization, or another
similar entity," (8) or in the exercise of First Amendment rights, "including free exercise of
religion, freedom of speech, and the right of assembly." Id.
84 Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976). The court expressly
limited its holding to the constitutional problems that arose because of the lack of
termination time for the curfew. Id. "The failure [of the curfew] to provide the hour at
which the curfew ends, makes the ordinance void for vagueness. Parents and minors
subject to the ordinance are not given fair notice of when children under the age of
seventeen are permitted to return to the streets." Id.
85 Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998). The court did not
apply rational basis because it accepted that minors do have some rights under the
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The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit to have addressed the issue twice,
rendering opinions on curfews that were extremely different in nature. 86
The earlier case found the curfew to be overbroad, and the merits were
not reached in the court's narrow holding.8 7 The latter case found the
curfew to be valid under a strict scrutiny analysis because the curfew
contained so many exceptions, thus satisfying the narrowly tailored
requirement. 88 Finally, the Ninth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to a
curfew ordinance because of the restriction on a minor's fundamental
right to free movement and held the ordinance to be overbroad and
unconstitutional. 89 It is very difficult to see the common ground with
these cases, and, absent any resolution by the Supreme Court, "no
discernible trend has yet appeared." 90 There are only a few consistencies

Constitution. Id. However, the court recognized that those rights are not coextensive with
those of adults. Id. Thus, the court felt that the most appropriate standard to use was
intermediate scrutiny, which required a showing that the ordinance was substantially
related to an important government interest. Id. The court found that the City had an
important (even compelling) interest in reducing juvenile violence, fostering the welfare of
its children, and protecting them from harm. Id. at 847-48. The court also held that the City
was justified in believing that the statute would meet the state's interest. Id. at 849; see also
Ross, supra note 56, at 836-37 (discussing the Schleifer decision).
86
See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d
1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
87
Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1071-72. The ordinance only contained exceptions for situations in
which a minor is accompanied by a parent or a responsible adult or is on an emergency
errand. Id. at 1071. The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
overbroad. Id. Because the ordinance lacked sufficient exceptions, the court was precluded
from narrowing the statute and found that it was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 1074.
However, the court specifically narrowed its holding to the overbreadth challenge and did
not rule on the constitutionality of curfew ordinances. Id.
8
Qutb, 11 F.3d at 496. The court found the ordinance to be constitutional and applied
strict scrutiny based on the assumption, for purposes of analysis, that the right to free
movement was fundamental. Id. at 492. However, the court declined to decide whether or
not the assumption was true. Id. In this case, the ordinance contained numerous
exceptions, including exemptions for employment, First Amendment activities, and
interstate travel. Id. at 490. Thus, the court found that the ordinance was narrowly tailored
to meet the state's compelling interest of protecting juveniles from crime on the streets. Id.
at 496.
89
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 952 (9th Cir. 1997). The court used strict
scrutiny to analyze this statute because of the fundamental rights that were implicated by
the ordinance. Id. at 944-46. The court held that the City did not show that the curfew was
narrowly tailored because it "sweeps broadly, with few exceptions for otherwise legitimate
activity." Id. at 949. For a complete discussion of the Nunez decision, see Beaumont, supra
note 50.
90
ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 53, at 1002; see also Privor, supra note 47, at 419
(suggesting that "the [Supreme] Court is practicing self-restraint, allowing the states to
experiment with innovative crime control techniques and allowing the curfews to be tested
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that can be gleaned from these cases: minors do have constitutional
rights; the conduct of minors may be regulated to a greater extent than
that of adults; exceptions to the ordinance are often outcome
determinative; and curfew ordinances are motivated by a compelling
state interest. 91
The inconsistencies in the circuit court opinions are due in part to the
varying levels of scrutiny that the courts have applied. 92 There are three
different levels of scrutiny that can be applied to constitutional issues:
rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. 93 In juvenile

in the laboratories of the states before making any legal pronouncements that might be
premature or lacking all the relevant data").
91
See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding
that the rights of juveniles are not coextensive with those of adults and that the state's
authority is broader over minor's conduct than it is for adults); Schleifer v. City of
Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the rights of minors are
not the same as those of adults and exceptions in the ordinance at issue were sufficiently
narrow to meet the city's compelling interest); Qutb, 11 F.3d at 496 (holding that the
ordinance was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest of the city); Johnson, 658
F.2d at 1074 (holding the ordinance to be unconstitutionally overbroad due to the lack of
sufficient exceptions).
92
See, e.g., Massey, supra note 80, at 775 (noting that only two circuit courts agree as to
what standard of review should apply in equal protection claims).
93
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 54, at 660. The lowest level of scrutiny a court can apply
when reviewing an equal protection claim is rational basis. Id. at 661. Rational basis
requires that the law be reasonable with a fair relation to the subject matter. Id. This is a
very deferential standard, and it is very rare for the Supreme Court to find a law that fails
this test. Id. at 661-62. The challenger carries the burden of proof at this level and will not
succeed unless he demonstrates that the law "has no legitimate purpose or that the means
used are not a reasonable way to accomplish the goal" or that "the government's action is
'clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.'" ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 652, 659 (2d ed. 2002)
(citation omitted). The Court has invalidated some laws at this level of review. Id. at 653;
see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); U.S. Dep't. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). The
Court now describes the level of review as "not a toothless one." Brown, supra note 54, at
661 (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
Intermediate scrutiny was explicitly laid out in Craig v. Boren, where the Court stated
the standard as "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
Id. at 666-67
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
(discussing Craig v. Bowen, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1971)). It is applied when the regulation is
based on poverty, age, and alienage (if for employment in a government job). Id.
The most stringent level of scrutiny is strict scrutiny, which requires a compelling
government interest and a statute that is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. Id. at 66365. This is an extremely difficult standard to meet, and statutes are much less likely to be
found constitutional. Id. at 665. This standard is applied only where a fundamental right is
at stake or where the individual challenging the constitutionality of the law is a part of a
suspect class. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982); Douglas A. Smith, A
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curfew cases, no uniform standard of review has been applied. 94
Rational basis has been used where one of three findings is present: (1)
the rights of minors have a diminished value; (2) the state has a
heightened interest in regulating children's behavior; or (3) there are no
fundamental rights burdened by the ordinance. 95 Intermediate scrutiny
has been applied in curfew litigation where the court recognizes that
minors do have constitutional rights but also that those rights are not
coextensive with those of adults; thus, a lesser degree of scrutiny is
appropriate.96 Finally, strict scrutiny has been applied when courts

Return to First Principles? Saenz v. Roe and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 2000 UTAH
L. REV. 305, 34243 (2000). A suspect class is one that has been laden with disabilities as a
result of discrimination, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated "to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14. A
fundamental right is a freedom that is essential to the concept of ordered liberty, a right
that is inalienable. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens have argued that a sliding scale of
review should replace the three levels of review for group classifications. CHEMERINSKY,
supra, at 646-47. The Court continues to carve out exceptions and make subcategories
within the three levels. Id. at 647. For instance, mental retardation is given "heightened
rational basis." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 471-72. Also, illegitimate persons are given slightly
less than intermediate scrutiny. N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620-21
(1973).
94 Lichtenbaum, supra note 6, at 685; see also Patryk J. Chudy, Note, Doctrinal
Reconstruction: Reconciling Conflicting Standardsin Adjudicating Juvenile Curfew Challenges, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 518, 554 (2000) ("Of the federal cases that have adjudicated juvenile
curfews under one of the three standards of scrutiny, ten federal judges have articulated
strict scrutiny ...ten have chosen intermediate scrutiny, and six have chosen rational
review.").
95 See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1257-58 (M.D. Penn.
1975) (finding that the conduct of minors can be regulated to a greater extent than adults so
rational basis was the appropriate standard to apply); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445
N.W.2d 363, 369 (Iowa 1989) (holding that rational basis was appropriate level of review
because there was no fundamental right of intracity travel); In re Spagnoletti, 702 N.E.2d
917, 920 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (applying rational basis since freedom of movement is not a
fundamental right of minors); Sale v. Goldman, 539 S.E.2d 446, 457 (W. Va. 2000) (applying
rational basis because age is not a suspect classification).
96 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541.
So "although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees.., as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust
its legal system to account for children's vulnerability" by exercising
broader authority over their activities. This means, at minimum, that a
lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate when evaluating restrictions on
minors' activities where their unique vulnerability, immaturity, and
need for parental guidance warrant increased state oversight.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847 (holding that intermediate scrutiny
was appropriate because children do possess qualified rights, which deserve something
more than rational basis review, but that their rights are not the same as those of adults so
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recognize that curfew ordinances do infringe on the fundamental rights
of minors and, regardless of the fact that minors' rights are not
coextensive with those of adults, find the highest level of scrutiny to be
97
appropriate.
Unfortunately, even when the same level of review was applied, the
reasoning and outcome of the cases have been conflicting. 98 There are a
number of reasons for this inconsistency. The most likely rationale is the
disagreement among the courts as to whether or not juveniles possess
the same fundamental rights as adults, which then determines whether
or not juveniles' rights should subject the curfews to strict scrutiny. 99
Another factor is that the courts do not agree if there are any
fundamental rights at stake in curfew litigation or if the curfews infringe
on such rights.100 This is often reliant on the exceptions that the curfew
contains, which vary from one ordinance to another. 10 1 A final
possibility is that courts choose to focus their analysis on different
theories of relief that are brought by plaintiffs, which are discussed
102
below.

the standard should be less than strict scrutiny); Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d
176, 184 (D. Conn. 1999) (applying intermediate review because minors do not possess the
same rights as adults).
9
See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997). The court applied
strict scrutiny because it found that there were fundamental rights at stake. Id. It also
noted that it did not believe a lesser degree of scrutiny was appropriate just because minors
were involved. Id.; see also Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993). For purposes of
analysis, the court assumed that minors had a fundamental right to move freely. Qutb, 11
F.3d at 492. The court also recognized that minors may be treated differently than adults
but applied strict scrutiny anyway. Id.
98 See Massey, supra note 80, at 775 ("Only two circuits agree on the standard of review
to apply to the equal protection claims, and those two disagree on the result.").
99 See supra Part II.A (discussing the history of the rights of minors); see also Hemmens &
Bennett, supra note 8, at 324-25 (noting that courts that find that minors' rights are the same
as those of adults apply strict scrutiny and those courts that do not apply only rational
basis).
100 See infra Parts II.C, III.C (recognizing the importance of the exceptions that are
contained in the ordinances in order to evaluate the fundamental rights that are at stake).
101 See supra this Part, Part II.B (discussing the components of curfew ordinances).
102 See infra Part II.C (discussing the theories of relief under which curfew cases are
brought).
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C. Theories of Relief
While some plaintiffs in curfew litigation bring a host of different
claims, the most common constitutional challenges to curfew ordinances
are brought under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 103
1.

First Amendment Claims

First Amendment claims generally address two different concerns.104
First, plaintiffs allege that the curfew ordinances violate their freedom of
speech, religion, assembly, and association, all of which are fundamental
rights. 05 Even though these rights are explicit in the Constitution,
children have not been afforded the same protection as adults. 06
Traditionally, courts have taken a more paternalistic approach to
children with regard to First Amendment issues and have allowed
stricter regulation of minors than adults. 10 7 This is justified because
parents have the authority to direct the upbringing of their children in
their own household, and the state has an interest in the well-being of
children. 108 Even though this is true, First Amendment claims are

Norton, supra note 9, at 179. See supra note 8 for the relevant constitutional provisions.
Another claim that is made on a rare occasion is that curfews infringe on a freedom of
movement that is found in the First Amendment. Poff, supra note 48, at 289. These claims
are made on the basis of an infringement on one's right to "social association." Id. The
Court has recognized that the freedom of association is limited and that the "Constitution
[does not] recognize a generalized right of 'social association.'" Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S.
19, 25 (1989).
105 Brown, supra note 54, at 677. The freedom of association was first officially recognized
as a constitutional right in the court system in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958). The freedom of association is a constitutional right included in the bundle of
First Amendment rights made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Louisiana ex rel Gremellon v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
106 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (holding that state could
restrict children from purchasing adult magazines even though it implicated their First
Amendment rights); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (holding that the
prohibition on children selling religious literature on the street was constitutional even
though it burdened First Amendment rights).
107 See Brown, supra note 54, at 678. "[Tihe rule that the rights of minors are not
coextensive with those of adults holds true in this [First Amendment] setting as well." Id.;
see also supra Part II.A.
108 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder. And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have
respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
103
104
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virtually always at issue. 10 9 However, this type of claim has been easily
avoided by cities or states by including an exception in the ordinance for
First Amendment activities, and, thus, most courts do not go through
any First Amendment analysiso
A second claim that is made under the First Amendment is that the
ordinances are vague and/or overbroad."' The "void for vagueness"
doctrine encompasses two main principles. 112 First, the ordinance must
define the offense clearly so that a person of reasonable intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited." 3 Second, the ordinance must
give clear guidelines to the enforcers of the statute to ensure that the
statute is not enforced in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner. 14 If these
two conditions are not met, the ordinance will be struck down on
vagueness grounds.115 The vagueness doctrine takes on particular
importance in cases that deal with First Amendment rights and has been
116
enforced more strictly in those situations.
The overbreadth doctrine is a First Amendment doctrine that applies
when a law regulates substantially more speech than is allowed by the
Constitution.117 This doctrine also has a special rule that enables persons

Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (citation omitted). The Prince Court further observed that "a
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies." Id. at 168.
109 Brown, supra note 54, at 677.
110 See Lichtenbaum, supra note 6, at 691.
111 Most curfew ordinances that have been the subject of litigation have been challenged
under either the vagueness or overbreadth doctrines. See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (challenging the ordinance as vague); Schleifer
v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 853 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); Johnson v. City of
Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1068 (5th Cir. 1981) (challenging the ordinance as both vague and
overbroad); Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176, 180 (D.C. Conn. 1999) (same);
Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303, 305 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (challenging the ordinance as
overbroad).
112 Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Finley v. Nat'l
Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1996)).
113 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). "[A statute must] give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited" and
"provide explicit standards for those who apply [the statue]." Id.
114 Id.
115 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 763 (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926)). Vague laws violate due process whether speech is involved or not. Id.
116 Id.
117 Lichtenbaum, supra note 6, at 692. "The overbreadth doctrine applies when a law
'does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [government] control but...
sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an
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to have standing in order to challenge a statute when they are not
personally harmed but can show that the statute would restrict the
speech of another person.18 Because laws that are overbroad have the
ability to "chill" constitutionally protected speech, the doctrine and its
standing rule are justified in certain situations.1 9 However, the Supreme
Court does not favor the doctrine and has repeatedly found that a statute
should not be invalidated because it is overbroad unless it is not subject
to a narrower construction and has a real and substantial deterrent effect
12
on First Amendment activity.
The two doctrines are very closely related and are most often alleged
simultaneously, but it is important to note that these doctrines are not
identical and require a separate analysis in order to be used to invalidate
a law. 1 21 The curfew ordinances that are most susceptible to these

exercise' of protected First Amendment rights." Id. (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
118
Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 957 (1984). The Court
held that
where the claim is that a statute is overly broad in violation of the First
Amendment, the Court has allowed a party to assert the rights of
another without regard to the ability of the other to assert his own
claims "'and with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with the requisite narrow specificity."'
Id. (citations omitted).
119
Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303, 305 (M.D. Ga. 1977).
Facial overbreadth scrutiny emphasizes the need to eliminate an
overbroad law's deterrent impact on constitutionally protected
expressive activity. "Chilling effect" is a short-hand way of describing
this vice of an overbroad law. Since by definition an overbroad statute
covers some privileged as well as non-privileged activity, the statutory
burden operates as a disincentive to action and creates an in terrorem
effect on conduct within the protection of the First Amendment ....
Lack of fair warning to actors or lack of adequate standards to guide
enforcers also may lead to a "chill" on privileged activity.
Id. (citing Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 459-60 (5th Cir. 1971)).
120
See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998) (holding that
there must be some substantial risk of suppressing speech in order to invalidate a statute
on its face); Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (holding the ordinance
to be overbroad because it was not susceptible to a narrowing construction and had both a
real and substantial deterrent effect); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)
("Application of the overbreadth doctrine ...is manifestly strong medicine. It has been
employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort. Facial overbreath has not been
invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged
statute.").
121
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 917. A law can be overbroad without being vague and
vice versa. Id. For example, in Board of Airport Commissionersof Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus,
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challenges are those that do not include exceptions, fail to define terms,
and fail to include proper hour requirements. 122
2.

Equal Protection and Due Process Claims

In addition to First Amendment challenges, actions have been
brought against curfew ordinances claiming violations of equal
protection and due process. 123 The Equal Protection Clause was adopted
124
in order to ensure that all persons are treated equally under the law.
This clause guarantees that no state can regulate a suspect class
differently or interfere with a fundamental right, unless the regulation
meets strict scrutiny.125 All curfew laws make distinctions based on age,
but the Supreme Court has found that age is not a suspect class; thus,
126
only a rational basis analysis is applied to regulations based on age.
Since rational basis is so deferential to the state, equal protection
challenges to curfew ordinances would fail virtually every time.127 The
more common use of the Equal Protection Clause for plaintiffs in curfew
litigation is the safeguarding of fundamental rights.128 If the court finds
that there is a fundamental right at stake in a particular case, strict
scrutiny is normally applied.1 29 The analysis is the same under the Due
130
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

482 U.S. 569, 574-75 (1987), the Court declared the ordinance overbroad because it
prohibited all protected expression, but did not consider the law vague. Id.
122 See Johnson v. Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
ordinance was void as overbroad because it did not contain any exceptions, other than for
emergency errands); Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding
that the ordinance was vague because it contained no end time); McCollester v. City of
Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1385 (D.N.H. 1984) (holding that the ordinance was overbroad
because it did not contain any exceptions for chaperoned juvenile activity).
123 Norton, supra note 9, at 179; see also supra note 8.
124 Lichtenbaum, supra note 6, at 682; see also supranote 8.
12i Lichtenbaum, supra note 6, at 682-83; see also supra note 93.
126 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd.of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
470 (1991); see also Norton, supra note 9, at 179. It has not been argued that minors are a
discrete and insular class, which deserves the utmost protection under the constitution.
Norton, supra note 9, at 179. Age, however, has been found to be subject only to rational
basis. Id.
127 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
12 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 526. "Since Brown, the Supreme Court has relied on
the equal protection clause as a key provision for combating invidious discrimination and
for safeguarding fundamental rights." Id.
129

See supra note 93.

130 Lichtenbaum, supra note 6, at 696. Similar to equal protection violations, courts will
look at whether or not the ordinance interferes with the fundamental rights of a minor in
order to determine whether or not a due process violation has occurred. Id. "Just as in
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Both parents and children allege that curfew ordinances encroach on
their fundamental rights.131
Parents typically argue that their
fundamental right to raise their children without governmental
interference is violated. 32 The Court first recognized this right in Meyer
v. Nebraska133 and has continually recognized it since. 134 However, the
Court has never held the right to be absolute. 135 For instance, the
Supreme Court has allowed the state to regulate school attendance, child
136
labor, and mandatory vaccinations.
Courts agree that parents do enjoy a fundamental right to guide the
upbringing of their children; however, they do not always agree as to
137
whether or not this right is infringed upon when curfews are enacted.

Equal Protection analysis, if the curfew ordinance infringes on a fundamental right, it is
subject to strict scrutiny, and therefore, must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. Id.
131 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 54, at 670-80 (discussing the rights of both minors and their
parents).
132 Norton, supra note 9, at 179. The right comes from the liberties protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399-400 (1923).
133 262 U.S. 390. The case dealt with a Nebraska statute that forbade the teaching of any
language other than English. Id. at 397.
134 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972) (finding a parent's right to free
exercise in the context of compulsory education, which was against the Amish religion);
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that the regulation infringed
on the parent's right to choose their child's education).
135 See supra Part II.A (discussing the state's power as parenspatriae).
136 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (citations omitted). The Court
stated:
[T]he mere fact [that] a state could not wholly prohibit this form of
adult activity ... does not mean it cannot do so for children. Such a
conclusion granted would mean that a state could impose no greater
limitation upon child labor than upon adult labor. Or, if an adult were
free to enter dance halls, saloons, and disreputable places generally, in
order to discharge his conceived religious duty to admonish or
dissuade persons from frequenting such places, so would be a child
with similar convictions and objectives, if not alone then in the parent's
company, against the state's command.
Id. at 168.
137 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding
that the parent's fundamental right to guide the upbringing of their children was not
implicated by the curfew); Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 852 (4th Cir.
1998) (recognizing that parents do not possess an unqualified right to raise their children);
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 952 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding the ordinance to be
an unconstitutional burden on the fundamental rights of parents to guide the upbringing of
their children); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding the statute did not
impermissibly infringe on parental rights); Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176,
188 (D. Conn. 1999) (holding that there was no violation of any fundamental rights);
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Some courts have explicitly recognized this parental right but failed to
find that the right was implicated by curfew ordinances or at least that
any intrusion was minimal. 138 Other courts have found that curfew
ordinances do unconstitutionally infringe on parental rights because the
curfews unduly burden the parents' right to be the primary authority
over their children.139 In many cases, however, the analysis focuses on
the language of the ordinance. When the particular curfew at issue
includes an exception for activities undertaken with a parent or
guardian, or activities done with the parent's consent, courts have found
the curfew valid on this point and invalid where the curfew lacked such
140
exceptions.
Children challenging the ordinance further argue that they are being
denied the right to travel or the right to freedom of movement. 141 While
the Supreme Court has recognized the right to interstate travel since the
nineteenth century, the Court has never expressly resolved the question
of whether or not there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel. 142 The
closest indication the Court has given to an explicit decision regarding
the right was in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,143 in which the

McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984) (holding the ordinance
invalid due to the infringement on parent's rights).
138

See supranote 137.

139 See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 951-52. The court held that the ordinance "[was] not a
permissible 'supportive' law, but rather an undue, adverse interference by the state." Id. at
952; see also McCollester, 586 F. Supp. at 1386. The court found that the ordinance was an
"impermissible intrusion into [the] plaintiff parents' privacy and liberty interests in family
and childbearing." McCollester, 586 F. Supp. at 1386.
140 See, e.g., Nunez, 114 F.3d at 952. "The ordinance does not allow an adult to preapprove even a specific activity after curfew hours unless a custodial adult actually
accompanies the minor.
Thus, parents cannot allow their children to function
independently at night, which some parents may believe is part of the process of growing
up." Id.
141 The right to free movement and the right to intrastate travel will be used
interchangeably throughout this Note.
142 Nicole I. Hyland, Note, On the Road Again: How Much Mileage Is Left on the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and How Far Will It Travel?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 187, 229 (2001). In fact,
the Court has explicitly declined to even address the issue in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974). Id.
143 506 U.S. 263 (1993). The case dealt with a request for a permanent injunction to stop
anti-abortion organizations from obstructing ingress or egress from facilities that provided
abortions or related counseling due to an alleged conspiracy to deprive women of their
fundamental right to interstate travel. Id. at 266.
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majority held that the intrastate restriction did not implicate the right of
interstate travel in that particular case. 144
Without any specific guidance from the Supreme Court, federal
circuit courts are divided on the issue. 145 The First, Second, and Third
Circuits have recognized the right to intrastate travel. 46 The courts
recognized that the right to interstate travel could not be effectuated
without recognizing the right to move within one's own state.147 The
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have refused to recognize the
right, and the District of Columbia has not decided the issue. 148 These
circuits have found that recognizing the fundamental right to interstate
travel does not necessitate finding a fundamental right to intrastate
travel. 149 Not all of the circuit courts have discussed the issue with
regard to curfew laws, but those that have are split on the issue. The
District of Columbia rejected the idea that minors have a fundamental
right to freedom of movement. 5 0 However, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
recognize, or at least assume, that there is some right to free

Id. at 277. "Such a purely intrastate restriction does not implicate the right of
interstate travel, even if it is applied intentionally against travelers from other States, unless
it is applied discriminatorily against them." Id. One scholar suggests that this holding
resolves the issue of intrastate travel and proposes that the decision explicitly ruled out a
fundamental right to intrastate travel. Hyland, supra note 142, at 230.
145
Hyland, supra note 142, at 229. The circuit courts have analyzed the issue in a variety
of contexts. Id. at 231. For example, they have examined "municipal durational residency
requirements for recipients of public benefits, residence requirements for public employees,
salary differentials for public employees based on residence, anti-cruising ordinances, and
juvenile curfews." Id. at 231-32 (citations omitted).
146
Id. at 232-36 (citing Lutz v. New York, 899 F.2d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1990); King v. New
Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971); Cole v. Hous. Auth., 434 F.2d 807
(1st Cir. 1970)).
147
See, e.g., King, 442 F.2d at 648 ('It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel
between the states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a
correlative constitutional right to travel within a state."); Hyland, supra note 142, at 232-38.
14
Hyland, supra note 142, at 232 (citing Wardwell v. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir.
1976); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1975); Ahern v. Murphy, 457
F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972); Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Va. 1986)).
149
See infra Part III.C.2 (analyzing the decisions on the rights to interstate and intrastate
travel).
150 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The court
suggested that adults do have such a right but limited the analysis to children's rights. Id.
"We think juveniles do not have a fundamental right to be on the streets at night without
adult supervision. The Supreme Court has already rejected the idea that juveniles have a
right to 'come and go at will' because 'juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some from of
custody.'" Id. (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)).
144
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movement.15 1 The more important question that arises with regard to
curfew litigation is this: if such a right were recognized, would it in fact
15 2
be extended to children?
III.

ANALYSIS

The inconsistencies and splits among the courts put forth the
framework for understanding the current state of the law. Part III
evaluates the decisions of the courts in order to determine what
constitutional issues are at stake with curfew ordinances.1 53 Subpart A
discusses the use of the Bellotti factors in curfew litigation. 154 In light of
that analysis, Subparts B and C look at the implications that curfew
155
ordinances have on the rights of parents and their minor children.
A. The Use of the Bellotti Factors
The Court in Bellotti intended its three-factor test to apply in
situations outside the abortion context because it recognized that minors
have a unique status under the law and did not explicitly limit its
holding to the abortion context. 156 Also, in promulgating the factors, the
Court relied on prior decisions outside the abortion context that
57
It
distinguished between the rights of minors and those of adults1
would be illogical to think that the factors do not apply in the context
from which they were derived. 15 Thus, the factors should apply outside
the abortion context and, in particular, should apply to curfew
ordinances.
An application of the Bellotti factors to a particular case does not
establish that a lower level of scrutiny should be applied to assess the

See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide whether or not
a fundamental right actually existed in the case but rather assumed so for purposes of the
analysis); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that the
right to travel "certainly extends in some measure to juveniles, as citizens of the United
States"). The Ninth Circuit discussed the issue in Nunez v. City of San Diego. 114 F.3d 935
(9th Cir. 1997). The court held that "the district court erred in stating that minors'
'circumscribed' liberty interest was not fundamental and could be subjected to
intermediate scrutiny." Id. at 946.
151

152

See infra Part III.C.

See infra this Part, Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B-C.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-37, 647-48, 651 (1979) (plurality opinion).
See generally id.; Poff, supra note 48, at 300.
158 Poff, supra note 48, at 300.
153
154
155
156
157
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constitutional rights of minors; rather, it enables courts to determine
whether the state has a compelling interest which justifies greater
restrictions on minors than on adults. 5 9 Such a justification is met in the
realm of curfew ordinances.
The first factor is the particular
vulnerability of children. 160 Courts and law enforcement officers have
both acknowledged the vulnerability of children to the dangers of the
streets at night.161 The Court has also established an entirely separate
juvenile justice system that affirms the notion that children are not to be
162
treated like adults due to their special vulnerabilities and needs.
The next factor is the inability of children to make critical decisions
in a proper manner.163 Here, the Court has acknowledged that "minors
often lack the experience, perspective and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." 164 Their immaturity
may lead to a decision to commit delinquent acts such as vandalism,
drug use, or violent crimes. 65 Adults may make the same decisions but
do so in a more mature, informed way with a better understanding of the
consequences of their actions. 166
Finally, the third factor is the importance of the parents' role in the
upbringing of their children. 167 Curfew laws actually reinforce parental
authority and encourage parents to be more active in the supervision of
their children. 16s Additionally, properly drafted ordinances give parents

159 Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 1997).

160 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
161 Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 848 (4th Cir. 1998).
"Each
unsuspecting child risks becoming another victim of the assaults, violent crimes, and drug
wars that plague America's cities. Given the realities of urban life, it is not surprising that
courts have acknowledged the special vulnerability of children to the dangers of the
streets." Id. (citation omitted). "Two experienced City [of Charlottesville] police officers
confirmed to the district that the children they observe on the streets after midnight are at
special risk of harm." Id.
162 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635. "[T]he State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for
children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ...paternal
attention."' Id. (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 413 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality
opinion)).
163 See supranote 46 and accompanying text.
164 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
165 People in Interest of J.M., 268 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo. 1989).
166 Id.

167 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
168 City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 368 (Iowa 1989) (quoting People in Interest
of J.M., 268 P.2d at 223); see also Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 639. The Supreme Court has recognized
"the special interest of the State in encouraging [minors] to seek [parental advice] in
making [important decisions]." Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 639. "Legal restrictions on minors,
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the ability to allow their minor children to be out past curfew hours,
which again gives the parents the ultimate decision-making power over
their children. 169 Therefore, cities and states are justified in restricting
the rights of minors by enacting curfew laws, even though it may not be
constitutional to do so for adults. In light of these considerations, the
rights alleged to be infringed upon by curfew ordinances are discussed
in the following subparts.
B.

Claims Under the First Amendment

The rights contained in the First Amendment are undoubtedly
fundamental under the Constitution and are afforded to children as well
as adults.170 However, children have been given less protection under
the First Amendment than adults. 171 Consequently, the courts have
concluded that exempting First Amendment activities from a curfew
ordinance is sufficient protection of the First Amendment rights of
minors. 172
Every reported federal case that has withstood a
constitutional challenge has contained an explicit First Amendment

especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for
the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful
and rewarding." Id. at 638-39.
169 See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the parental
right to guide the upbringing of their children).
170 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that
students in public schools have First Amendment rights).
171 See supra Part II.A; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988)
(holding that the students' newspaper is not protected under the First Amendment); Bethel
Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (recognizing that "the First Amendment gives a
high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket")
(citations omitted); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985) (affirming the notion
that the constitutional rights of students are not automatically coextensive with those of
adults).
172 Brown, supra note 54, at 677-78. The exception can merely be "for the exercise of any
First Amendment rights." Id. In cases that do not contain exceptions for First Amendment
activity, courts have analyzed the First Amendment claims in a variety of ways. Id. For
instance, the district court in Bykofsky held that the curfew ordinance did not regulate
speech under the rubric of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Bykofsky v.
Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1260 (M.D. Pa. 1975). The Ninth Circuit
analyzed the curfew under a time, place, and manner test, which includes three parts: (1)
the curfew must be content neutral; (2) it must be narrowly tailored to advance a significant
government interest; and (3) it must leave open alternative channels of communication.
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 951 (9th Cir. 1997). The court found that the
ordinance failed the test because it was not narrowly tailored since it failed to exempt First
Amendment activities. Id. The time, place, and manner analysis raises numerous other
issues, which are beyond the scope of this Note.
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exception. 173 Some commentators argue that the exception itself is what
makes the curfew unconstitutionally vague. 174 They allege that it would
take a "constitutional scholar" to know which activities would be
covered under such an exception. 75 This argument is rebutted by a
stronger notion-that the exception is really no more vague than the
actual amendment itself. 176 There certainly are activities that will
undoubtedly fall within the exception and some that will not, but
situations in between are not enough to render the ordinance vague. 7 It
would be inconsistent to find that the exception is vague when its
foundation gives no additional guidance.
The First Amendment exception ensures that protected activities
remain secure and is better than having no protection at all. 78 In regard
to challenges that the ordinances are overbroad, allowing the exception
is the only way to properly narrow the ordinances, ensuring that only
the necessary activity is regulated. Thus, it is clear from past curfew

173 Hodgkins v. Goldsmith, No. IP99-1528-C-T/G, 2000 WL 892964, *14 (S.D. Ind. July 3,
2000). "[E]very reported federal case in which a curfew law has been upheld against
constitutional challenge has involved a curfew law with significantly broader exceptions,
including an explicit First Amendment exception." Id. The lack of a First Amendment
exception will generally invalidate a curfew ordinance. Chudy, supra note 94, at 568.
174 Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Chudy,
supranote 94, at 568.
175 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 546; see also Chudy, supra note 94, at 568.
176 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 546; see also Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 853
(4th Cir. 1998); Sale v. Goldman, 539 S.E.2d 446, 458 (W. Va. 2000).
177 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 546.
[I]t is perfectly clear that some activities, such as religious worship and
political protests, would be protected under the defense, and that other
activities, such as rollerblading would not. That there may be
marginal cases between these two poles can be addressed as they arise,
but such cases do not render the provision void for vagueness.
Id. (citation omitted).
178 Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 853. The court stated:
We decline to punish the City for its laudable effort to respect the First
Amendment. A broad exception from the curfew for such activities
fortifies, rather than weakens, First Amendment values.... If councils
draft an ordinance with exceptions, those exceptions are subject to a
vagueness challenge. If they neglect to provide exceptions, then the
ordinance is attacked for not adequately protecting First Amendment
freedoms. It hardly seems fitting, however, for courts to chastise
elected bodies for protecting expressive activity.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Sale, 539 S.E.2d at 458-59.
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litigation that an exception for First Amendment activity is the best
answer to the problem that has been suggested thus far. 179
The shortcoming of the courts' analyses is that most do not focus on
whether or not the exceptions are defenses to prosecution or if they are
exceptions to enforcement of the curfew.180 If they are merely defenses
to the prosecution of the offense, it will likely have a chilling effect on
minors' First Amendment rights.181 This is because if minors have to be
arrested and charged first, they have already suffered some harm.
Without any decisions discussing this issue, one could possibly infer that
the courts have not been troubled by any possible chilling effect.
Therefore, the most effective way to deal with First Amendment
problems is to include an exception to enforcement of the curfew for a
First Amendment activity, rather than a defense to prosecution.

179 A good illustration of this principle is what occurred with the Indiana curfew. The
state curfew was found unconstitutional in the summer of 2000 because it did not contain
an exception for First Amendment activity. Federal Judge Rules State Curfew Law Legal,
available at http://www.indygov.org/mayor/press/2001/November/01-15-01htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2002). However, the Mayor immediately took action to introduce a Marion
County curfew ordinance and, after it passed the City-County Council, began enforcing the
curfew. Id. The Indiana Civil Liberties Union ("ICLU") immediately sued to stop the
implementation of the ordinance. Id. The same federal judge who found the ordinance
unconstitutional last summer, denied the ICLU's request and ruled that it was "likely
constitutional because it provides ample room for minors to engage in First Amendment
activities and does not infringe on parents' rights to govern their children's nighttime
activities." Id.
180 But see Hodgkins ex rel Hodgkins v. Peterson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
The court in Hodgkins discussed the significance of including a First Amendment "defense"
or "exception." Id. at 1145-50. The plaintiffs were concerned because under the curfew, the
First Amendment defense was an affirmative defense that would not come into play
during the time of arrest. Id. at 1145. Thus, it would potentially chill the speech of minors
subject to the curfew. Id. The court, however, determined that a police officer is required
to take into account the "totality of the circumstances to determine whether probable cause
exists to make an arrest." Id. at 1148.
181 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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C. FundamentalRights Implicated by Curfew Ordinances
[Miost curfew ordinancesdo not substantially burden a
juvenile'sfundamental rights. Furthermore,the fundamental
rights ofjuveniles do not equal those of adults, and curfews,
182
therefore, should not be examined under strict scrutiny.
There are three common rights that are alleged to be fundamental
and burdened by curfew ordinances: the parental right to guide the
upbringing of their children, the child's right to interstate travel, and the
child's right to intrastate travel.
1.

The Parental Right To Guide the Upbringing of Their Children

There is little debate that the parental right to guide the upbringing
of their children is fundamental. 183 However, such a right is not
absolute. The state as parens patriaecan restrict parental control in many
ways. 184 The enactment of curfew ordinances is a good example of
where such restriction is necessary and warranted. If the right to
parental upbringing was absolute, one could infer that the state does not
have the power to regulate juvenile delinquency, which is obviously not

182 Brown, supra note 54, at 670-71.
183 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (finding that parents had a
fundamental interest to "guide the religious future and education of their children"); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that "the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder"); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the parental right to control and direct child's education);
see also supra Part II.C.2.
184 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. The Supreme Court in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey cast doubt
on the notion that the fundamental rights of parents to guide the upbringing of their
children includes the right to allow their children in public places after curfew hours. 505
U.S. 833 (1992). The Court focused on the private matters of the family and mentioned that
those interests that are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment are those that are
central to personal dignity and autonomy. Id. at 851; see also Sale v. Goldman, 539 S.E.2d
446 (W. Va. 2000). The court noted that
juveniles, unlike adults are always in some form of custody ....
Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take
care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of
their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part
as parens patriae ....In this respect, the juvenile's liberty interest may,
in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's "parens
patriaeinterest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child."
Sale, 539 S.E.2d at 454 (citations omitted); see also Brown, supra note 54, at 678-79 ("In some
situations, the Court has stated that it is appropriate for the state to step in and either fill in
where the parent is deficient or aid the parent in raising a child."); see also supraPart II.A.
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the case. 185 The state also has a compelling interest in protecting the
community from crime and in protecting children from becoming
victims of crime.1 86 The Court has sustained other regulations in light of
87
this interest.
Furthermore, the cases where the Court has found parental rights to
be fundamental do not involve the same circumstances or restrictions
that are at issue with curfew ordinances.1 8 8 The aspect of the parental
right that is alleged to be infringed by curfew laws is not personal in
nature and does not define the attributes of personhood, the concept of
existence, or the meaning of the universe or human life, as in the earlier
cases. 189 In other words, the ordinances do not infringe upon the
intimate family decisions on which the Court has previously ruled. 190
The only infringement on parental rights that occurs in enacting curfews
is the right to allow a minor child to remain on the streets during the

See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979). "[Alithough children are generally
protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are
adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability
185

....
18

Id. .

See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
187 See, e.g., Hodgkins ex rel Hodgkins v. Peterson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
The court determined that the state did have a compelling interest in the safety and wellbeing of its children. Id. at 1144. It relied primarily on cases that dealt with protecting
children from pornography and crime prevention. Id.
188 Hodgkins v. Peterson, No. IP00-1410-C-T/G, 2000 WL 33128726, at *11 (S.D. Ind. Dec.
14, 2000). The rights recognized in other cases "are of a higher quality than that claimed by
plaintiff in the instant case." Id. The plaintiff did not convince the court that the decision
of a parent to allow his child to be in public places after curfew hours would
fundamentally affect a person. Id.; see also Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531,
540-42 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 853 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999)). The Hutchins court, after reviewing Meyer, Pierce,
Prince, and Yoder, noted that
We glean from these cases, then, that insofar as a parent can be
thought to have a fundamental right, as against the state, in the
upbringing of his or her children, that right is focused on the parents'
control of the home and the parents' interest in controlling, if he or she
wishes, the formal education of children. It does not extend to a
parent's right to unilaterally determine when and if children will be on
the streets-certainly at night. That is not among the 'intimate family
decisions' encompassed by such a right.
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540-41.
189 Hodgkins, 2000 WL 33128726, at *11.
190 Hodgkins, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. The court also noted that the newest case in which
the parental right was examined dealt with a "mother's right to control the persons with
whom her children associated and consequently, the persons who would have influence
over them." Id. at 1161. It noted that this too was of a "higher quality that than claimed by
Plaintiff in the instant case." Id. at 1162.
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curfew hours. 191 It is illogical to equate the right to direct the education
of a child with the right to allow a child to roam the streets unsupervised
at night. Extending this fundamental right to the situation of curfew laws
would embroil the federal courts into family law, a matter traditionally
left to the states. 92 It would also be too easy for plaintiffs to then plead
in such a way that would elevate the rights of children to adults and
make them coextensive, which traditionally has been found by the courts
193
not to be the case.
Nevertheless, few curfews even remotely tread on this parental right
because most ordinances contain exceptions for juveniles who are out
after curfew hours with their parents or with their parents' consent. 9 4
Even courts that recognize the right to guide the upbringing of one's
children in connection with curfew laws do not find the ordinance
unconstitutional when it contains such exceptions. 95 Thus, including
such exceptions does not take away any control from the parents but
instead allows them to make choices with regard to their children's
conduct. In fact, some parents even agree that the curfew aids in
196
controlling and monitoring their children.
Therefore, since the parental right to guide the upbringing of their
children is not implicated by curfew ordinances and in most cases is not
even at issue due to exceptions in the ordinance, only rational basis
should be applied in analyzing these claims. Since rational basis is so
deferential to the state, its application would not impede enforcement of
the ordinance.

191 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540. The court did not think a higher level of scrutiny should be
used regarding the parental right to guide the upbringing of children, "not because we
think that no such fundamental right exists in any dimension, but rather because we think
it not implicated by the curfew." Id. Any infringement is limited to certain times and to
children of certain ages. See Brown, supra note 54, at 679.
192 Hodgkins, 2000 WL 33128726, at *12.
193 Id.
194 See, e.g., PHOENIX, ARIZ., CODE § 22-1 (2001); DENVER, COLO., CODE § 34-61(b)(1)-(2)
(2001); KANSAS CITY, KAN., CODE § 50-237(a)(1)-(2) (1998); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE § 21123(a)-(b) (2001).
195 See supra Part .C.2 (discussing the courts' views on the parental right to guide the
upbringing of their children).
1% Eric Stirgus, Largo Crafts Revision to Juvenile Curfew, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 27,
2001 at 8, 2001 WL 28597154. One Commissioner stated "she has encountered several
parents with little control over their children who told her the curfew was the only way
they could make their kids abide by their rules." Id. She also said that she thought "it in
some ways puts (authority) back in control of the parents." Id.
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Children's Rights
The minor's interestin freedom of movement upon the streets
during the nighttime curfew hours under circumstancesother
than those providedfor in the numerous curfew exceptions is
clearly outweighed by the governmental interests which the
ordinancefurthers397

Juveniles generally argue that there are two basic fundamental rights
at issue in curfew litigation: the right to interstate travel and the right to
intrastate travel. 98 The rights are independent of each other, but they
need to be examined together to get a better understanding of their
relationship. It is clear that there is a fundamental right to interstate
travel. 99 The right to travel has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
as a fundamental right and a liberty interest, which should be analyzed
under strict scrutiny. 2°° Additionally, the right is applicable to all
"persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment. 201
The purpose of the fundamental right to interstate travel is both to
protect travelers from barriers to interstate movement and from being
202
treated differently than citizens of the state to which they are traveling.
In other words, it was meant to prevent states from extending fewer
rights or privileges to new residents than it extended to established
residents of the state.20 3 The cases in which the right to interstate travel

197 Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242,1258 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
198 See, e.g., Norton, supra note 9, at 179; Sasse, supranote 81, at 681.
199 Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The right to travel
was declared fundamental in U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966). The precise source
of the right is unclear, but it has been said to come from a number of sources: the concern
over state discrimination against out-of-staters, rather than the concern to freely move
about; the Commerce Clause; the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; the Articles of Confederation as a necessary part of the Union that the
Constitution created; the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV; and from general
principles of federalism. See id., 188 F.3d at 635-47 (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999);
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Guest, 383 U.S. 745; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941)); see also Sasse, supra note 81, at 682.
200 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
The Court held that residency
requirements for welfare benefits were unconstitutional. Id. at 627. The requirements
violated the fundamental "freedom of travel" by discouraging poorer families from
moving wherever they would like. Id. at 638.
201 Foreman, supra note 7, at 731 (citing Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974); Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618; Edwards, 314 U.S. 160).
202 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
203 Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 F. Supp. 749, 753 (D. Va. 1986). "The fundamental right to
travel, however, is not necessarily movement, but the ability and opportunity to migrate,
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has been recognized deal with situations that would tend to deter
2°
someone from moving freely or infringe on another liberty interest. 4
Curfew ordinances do not tend to pose either of these problems. They
are applied to all minors, both in-state and out-of-state citizens. Whether
or not they would deter anyone from moving from state to state is
questionable as well, since most of the persons covered by the
ordinances already lack the freedom of movement in the sense that they
are denied the right to drive.
The resolution of the issue is not critically important in curfew
litigation because the right to interstate travel is not discussed in any
significant length in any of the circuit court decisions on the
constitutionality of curfew laws. Nonetheless, in order to safeguard the
ordinance's constitutionality, drafters often include an exception for such
travel. 205 The basic problem lies with finding the line between interstate
20 6
and intrastate travel, which has been blurred in past decisions.
Plaintiffs in curfew litigation often rely on the interstate cases to
support their contention that a fundamental right to intrastate travel
exists as well.20 7 This reliance is unfounded for two reasons. First, the
sources from which the right to travel arise do not support its extension
to intrastate travel. 20 8 The Article VI Privileges and Immunities Clause
does not support the extension because it applies only to state action that
discriminates against nonresidents. 2°9 Curfew laws treat all minors the

resettle, find a new job and start a new life." Id. (citing Wardwell v. Bd. of Educ. of City
Sch. Dist. of Cincinnati, 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1976)).
204 See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (finding that distributing income
based on the length of citizens' residency is unconstitutional); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 336, 338 (1972) (holding that a one-year residency requirement to vote infringed on
both the right to vote and the right to interstate travel); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630-31 (holding
that a one-year residency requirement as a condition for receiving welfare benefits a
violation of the right to interstate travel).
205 See, e.g., DENVER, CO., CODE § 34-61(b)(3) (2001); KANSAS CITY, KAN., CODE § 50237(a)(6) (1998); SAN ANTONIO, TEx, CODE § 21-123(h) (2001); see also Hutchins v. District of
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (curfew contained an exception where a minor
was "in a vehicle involved in interstate travel"); Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d
843, 846 (4th Cir. 1998) (curfew contained an exception for "minors who are engaged in
interstate travel").
206
See Sasse, supra note 81, at 683-85.
207
208

Id. at 683.
Id. at 685-90.

"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see also Jason Hangartner, The
Constitutionality of Large Scale Police Tactics: Implicationsfor the Right of Intrastate Travel, 14
PACE L. REV. 203, 222 (1994).
209
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same and make no distinction between residents and nonresidents.
Similarly, the Commerce Clause is inapplicable because curfew laws are
facially neutral toward and do not impose any burden on interstate
commerce. 210 A final theory that is used to possibly support the right to
travel is the Due Process Clause. 211 This contention fails as well because
under due process analysis, in order for a right to be fundamental, it
must either be "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' or "'deeply
rooted in the Nation's history and tradition."' 212 The right to intrastate
travel does not fall into either of these categories.
The second reason that the right to interstate travel cannot be
extended to include intrastate travel is that, while the Supreme Court
may have suggested that there is some right to free movement, these
comments have been nothing more than dicta. 213 For instance, the
primary case relied on is Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville.214 The Court
in Papachristoudid mention that the ability to move freely about was an
important amenity of life, but the vagrancy law at issue was struck down
on vagueness grounds and the discussion about free movement was only
dicta.215 The case also focused on the freedom of adults, not children,

Hangartner, supra note 209, at 222. The "dormant" Commerce Clause does not
support the right either because "if the right ...is derived from the negative Commerce
Clause, then 'it could be eliminated by Congress.' Second, ... there is no protectionist
motive on the part of the state or municipality in enacting a curfew law." Sasse, supra note
81, at 687 (citations omitted).
211
Hangartner, supra note 209, at 222.
212
Id.; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (recognizing as a
new formulation for fundamental rights as those deeply rooted in the history and tradition
of the nation); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (defining a fundamental right
as one that is implicit in ordered liberty).
213
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The cases cited
dealt with travel across borders, not mere "locomotion." Id.
214 405 U.S. 156 (1972). The case dealt with the constitutionality of a vagrancy ordinance
in Jacksonville, Florida. Id. at 157. Eight persons were convicted, fined, and sentenced to
jail time. Id. at 156-67.
215
Id. at 162. "This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it 'fails to give
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute,' . . . and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and conviction." Id.
(citations omitted).
While vagrancy statutes certainly prohibit individuals from moving
about, the constitutional infirmity in these statutes is not that they
infringe on a fundamental right to free movement, but that they fail to
give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden and pose a danger of
arbitrary enforcement. In other words, they do not afford procedural
due process.
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 537.
210
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and never identified walking or loitering as rights, just their importance
216
to a free society.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
fundamental right to free movement does not exist. 217 For instance,
when the Supreme Court dismissed Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of
Detroit218 due to a lack of a substantial federal question, it implied that
there was not a right of intrastate travel that was federally protected. 219
A dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal question is
essentially a decision on the merits of the case. 220 Thus, the dismissal

216 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164.
The Court, after reaching its decision on the
constitutionality of the ordinance, noted that
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the
amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in
the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities
have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of
independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These
amenities have dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right
to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have
encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating
silence.
Id. (emphasis added).
217 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 537.
218 190 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. 1971), cert. dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972). The case involved a
Detroit residency requirement that was imposed on policemen through a municipal
ordinance. Id. at 97. It was alleged that the requirement unconstitutionally infringed on
the right to intrastate travel. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court applied the rational basis
test because there was not a fundamental right at issue and determined the ordinance to be
valid. Id. at 101.
219 Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 405 U.S. 950 (1972). The appeal was
"dismissed for want of a substantial federal question." Id; see also Wright v. City of Jackson,
506 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1975). The Fifth Circuit stated:
Any doubt that the "right to travel" rationale of Shapiro and Dunn
was meant to apply to intrastate travel and municipal employment
residency requirements was put to rest by the Supreme Court's
treatment of litigation challenging a Detroit ordinance similar to the
Jackson residency requirement. The Detroit ordinance was sustained
by the Michigan Supreme Court on the traditional equal protection test
that the classification bore a reasonable relationship to the object of the
legislation. An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court
which ordered that the case be "dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question."
Wright, 506 F.2d at 902 (citations omitted). For a complete discussion of this argument, see
Hyland, supra note 142.
220 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959); see also Wright, 506 F.2d at 902-03;
Ahem v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1972). "[T]he Supreme Court has labeled as
unsubstantial the very question which constitutes the plaintiffs' most likely basis for
asserting federal question jurisdiction." Ahern, 457 F.2d at 365. In fact, this type of
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was the same as finding that there was not a federally protected right to
intrastate travel. This notion was reinforced by the fact that the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to rule differently in Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County221 but declined to do so.222 In that case, the Court noted
that, if the right to travel meant merely movement, even a bona fide
residency requirement would burden that right, and the Court has found
the opposite to be true.223 Thus, it is entirely consistent for the Court to
recognize the right to interstate travel without recognizing the right to
intrastate travel.
Since the Court has refused to explicitly recognize the right for
adults, it would be unreasonable to think it would recognize the right for
children since children's rights are not coextensive with those of
adults.224 In curfew cases, the only conduct that is regulated is the hours
in which juveniles can be outside of their homes. 2 Recognizing a right
for juveniles to roam the streets unsupervised at night would conflict
with the state's established power to regulate children in order to
preserve and promote their welfare. 226 The government already places
numerous other restrictions on children through its police power, all of
which are done for a child's welfare.227 Thus, it would be inconsistent to
find that freedom of movement is a fundamental right for children when
the Court has already concluded that the state can intrude upon a
juvenile's freedoms in so many other areas. 228 Moreover, the Supreme

dismissal in a state court appeal is the equivalent of an affirmance on the merits from a
federal court with regard to the federal questions. Id. at 364.
415 U.S. 250 (1974).
222 Id. at 255-56 ("Even were we to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate
and intrastate travel, a question we do not now consider.. .
m2

Id.at 255.

224 See supra Part lI.A (discussing the history of the treatment of the rights of minors).
M Brown, supra note 54, at 677.
n26 Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1999). "[T]he
recognition of such a right would fly in the face of the state's well-established powers of
parens patriaein preserving and promoting the welfare of children." Id.
227 Veilleux, supra note 4, at 1056.
m2 Id. Other restrictions include requiring school attendance, prohibiting minors from
working in certain industries, regulating the consumption of alcohol, banning the
intermingling of minors with adults at certain establishments, and restricting voting,
marriage, gun ownership, and motor vehicle operation. Id. All of these classifications are
based on age and are all a matter of legislative, not judicial concern. Id; see also Hutchins,
188 F.3d at 539. The court held "it would be inconsistent to find a fundamental right here,
when the Court has concluded that the state may intrude upon the 'freedom' of juveniles in
a variety of similar circumstances without implicating fundamental rights." Hutchins, 188
F.3d at 539.
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Court has explicitly recognized that minors lack some of the most
fundamental rights, including the right to come and go at will.229
Therefore, there are no fundamental rights at issue with a properly
drafted curfew ordinance. Thus, rational basis is the level of review that
the courts should use to examine curfew ordinances. In the event that a
court would still apply strict scrutiny, the next Part of this Note suggests
a model ordinance that would withstand such a challenge.
IV. A MODEL ORDINANCE
This Part will propose portions of a model ordinance. It is limited
only to those sections which have been at issue in past curfew litigation.
However, there are a few other general provisions that must be included
in a curfew ordinance. It should include the purposes for enacting the
curfew and, if possible, statistics showing the need for the curfew. 23°
While statistics are not necessary, a court will be more willing to uphold
the statute where there is specific, hard evidence to prove its necessity. 231
Additionally, a severablility provision should be added to the ordinance
so that the court can sever any parts of the ordinance it may find
32
problematic rather than find the entire ordinance to be overbroad.2

Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995). "Traditionally at common
law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of
self-determination-including even the right of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to
come and go at will." Id.
230
McDowall et al., supra note 56, at 59. Including statistics that show that juveniles do
commit a large share of the city's crime and that crime rates are high during curfew hours
gives the ordinance "a reasonably secure legal basis." Id.; see also Hodgkins ex rel Hodgkins
v. Peterson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1139 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (noting that while specific statistics
are not required at the preliminary injunction stage, it can be reasonably inferred that crime
rates increase at night or that juveniles will most likely be victimized at night).
21
See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1968). "We do not demand of
legislatures scientifically certain criteria of legislation." Id. (citation omitted); see also Action
for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (recognizing that
scientific evidence is not required to support interest in enacting legislation). Not having to
produce empirical evidence works to the advantage of the city because it is fairly easy to
convince a court in today's society that there is a problem with juvenile crime, and studies
are inconclusive as to whether or not the ordinances are effective. Hemmens & Bennett,
supra note 8, at 326.
232
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982).
When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as
overbroad, it should, of course, construe the statute to avoid
constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to such a limiting
construction. Furthermore, if the federal statute is not subject to a
narrowing construction and is impermissably overbroad, it
229
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Ordinances must also detail the procedure to be followed when a minor
is stopped for a possible curfew violation and the punishment for
233
violations.
Under the proposed ordinance, minors will be given sufficient notice
as to what activities are prohibited under the statue, and activity that is
lawful will be properly exempted from enforcement of the statute.
Additionally, the fundamental right of parents to guide the upbringing
of their children will not be burdened as the curfew will serve to help
parents maintain control of their children but will also allow for parents
to consent to their children's activities outside the hours of the curfew.23
Finally, even if a court were to apply strict scrutiny, the exceptions make
the ordinance narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interests of cities
to protect juveniles and the community from crime.
235
Section 1: Definitions

As used in this Chapter:
(a) "Minor"is anyone who is seventeen (17) years of age or younger, who is
not judicially emancipated or married.
(b) "Public place" means any place to which the public or a substantial
group of the public has access and includes, but is not limited to, streets,
highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses,
office buildings, transportfacilities, and shops.
(c) "Business establishment" means any privately owned place of business
operatedfor a profit to which the public is invited, including but not limited
to, any place of amusement or entertainment.
(d) "Parent" refers to a natural parent, adoptive parent, step-parent,
guardian, or any person who is at least eighteen (18) years of age and
authorized by the parentor guardian to have care and custody of a minor.

nevertheless should not be stricken down on its face; if it is severable,
only the unconstitutional portion is to be invalidated.
Id. See also Veilleux, supranote 4, at 1069.
233 These issues have been addressed under the realm of the Fourth Amendment, which
is beyond the scope of this Note.
234 See supra Part III.C.1 (analyzing the parental right to guide the upbringing of their
children).
235 These definitions have been incorporated from the ordinances that have been cited
throughout this Note.
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(e) "Curfew hours" are from 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. on any Sunday,
Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday and between 12:00 a.m.
236
(midnight)and 6:00 a.m. on any Friday or Saturday.
Commentary
Section 1 clearly defines the ordinance's material terms in order to
ensure that all persons who will be subject to the ordinance are aware of
the conduct that is prohibited. Minor is defined narrowly so that only
those who are not judicially recognized as adults are subject to the
ordinance. Next, public place is broadly defined so as to encompass all
areas that could possibly be a place where children could be after curfew
hours. Business establishment is also broadly defined but provides
examples so as to indicate the most common areas where juveniles
would likely be found after curfew hours. The term parent is defined to
include anyone who has custody or control of a minor. It encompasses
those persons in order to ensure that the ordinance does not infringe on
the parental right to guide the upbringing of their children. With this
definition, parents do not lose any control over the whereabouts of their
children because they can consent to their minor child being with an
adult of their choosing. Finally, and most importantly, is the definition
of curfew hours. To define these hours specifically is important to avoid
a vagueness challenge. This particular time frame is commonly used in
curfew ordinances.
Section 2: Offenses
(a) It shall be unlawful for a minor to purposefully remain in a public place,
motor vehicle, or business establishmentduring curfew hours.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any owner, operator, or employee of a business
establishment to allow minors, unless unaccompanied by a parent or
participating in an exempted activity, to remain in such establishments
during curfew hours, unless the minor refuses to leave and the police are
notified.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any parentor guardianwho has legal custody of
a minor to knowingly, or by lack of supervision and control, allow a minor
to remain in any public place or business establishment during curfew
hours, unless the activityfalls within one of the delineated exceptions.

236

See supra note 10 for examples of ordinances that contain similar hour provisions.
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Commentary
Section 2 sets forth the offenses that are prohibited by the ordinance.
The word "remain" is used in section (a), because it is easier to interpret
than "loiter" or "hang around." 237 It is common for curfews to provide
provisions that punish both parents and business establishments for
allowing a minor to violate the curfew ordinance. In order to make
curfew laws successful, the entire community needs to be involved, and
people need to be held accountable for enforcing the ordinance
consistently. 238 Additionally, the business owner is only liable if he does
not do what he can to make the minor leave. Parents are only liable if
they fail to properly supervise their children. Thus, some affirmative act
is needed. These provisions have not normally been challenged in
curfew litigation.
Section 3: Exceptions to Enforcement
The curfew does not apply in thefollowing situations:239
(a) When a minor is accompanied by a parent;
(b) When a minor is on a reasonably necessary errand at the bequest of his
parent, guardian, or person who has been charged with the care of the
minor;
(c) hen a minor is engaged in FirstAmendment activity;
(d) hen a minor is in a motor vehicle traveling to or from an employmentrelated activity;
(e) hen a minor is in a vehicle engaged in interstate travel;
(0 hen a minor is on direct routefrom any civic or governmentfunction;
(g) hen a minor is on the sidewalk which abuts the minor's home or the
home of a neighbor; and
(h) When a minor is involved in an emergency, which involves the
protection of a person or propertyfrom an imminent threat of serious bodily
240
injury or substantial damage.

237 Veilleux, supra note 4, at 1087.
238 See infra note 246.
239 These exceptions have been fashioned from the ordinances which have been discussed
throughout this Note.
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Commentary
Section 3 sets forth the exceptions to the enforcement of the
242
statute. 241 The exceptions are the most crucial parts of the ordinance.
In this particular ordinance, the exceptions apply at the time the minor is
initially stopped by the police, rather than at the time of prosecution.
This is important because if the defense is only to prosecution, there will
be a greater chance that protected speech will be chilled because minors
243
will be apprehensive about being stopped and arrested or detained.
Additionally, if the defense is only to prosecution, the harm has already
been done if the minor was arrested and charged as the ordinance
provides. The problem is eliminated if the exception applies at the time
the ordinance would be enforced. Each of these exceptions is important
to avoid prohibiting conduct that is not unlawful or is even protected
under the Constitution. They are also common among the ordinances
that have withstood constitutional scrutiny and those that have recently
244
been enacted.
V.

CONCLUSION

The modern trend is to uphold juvenile curfew ordinances as long as
the curfew includes exceptions for certain activities, and the city shows
there is some crime problem or valid reason for the enactment of the
curfew. 245 Curfews have the ability to restore and maintain order in

240 This definition was taken from Hodgkins ex rel Hodgkins v. Peterson. 175 F. Supp. 2d
1132, 1137 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (interpreting Ind. Code Ann. § 31-37-3-3.5 (West 2002)).
Defining the word "emergency" will lessen the likelihood that the ordinance will be
deemed vague.
241 Veilleux, supra note 4, at 1068-69. One scholar divided the important exceptions into
three categories: legal guardianship/supervision, prudential/practical, and fundamental
rights. See Chudy, supranote 94, at 518. These categories were based on the curfew at issue
in Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993). Legal guardianship/supervision exceptions
include "accompanied by a guardian, errand directed by a guardian, sidewalk of minor's
residence and emancipated minor." Chudy, supra note 94, at 565. Prudential/practical
exceptions include "employment activity, school/civic function and emergency situation."
Id. Fundamental rights include "First Amendment rights and Interstate travel." Id.
242 Hodgkins v. Goldsmith, No. IP99-1528-C-T/G, 2000 WL 892964, *1 (S.D. Ind. July 3,
2000). "It is the constrictive narrowness of the permitted exceptions to the Indiana curfew
law that is its downfall, not the fundamental effort to set reasonable hours for minors." Id.
243 See supra Part III.B (discussing the issues that arise due to the defenses or exceptions
applying at the time of arrest or prosecution).
244 See supra Part III.B-C for a discussion regarding the importance of the exceptions
under all of the claims that plaintiffs bring in curfew litigation.
245 Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 8, at 326.
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neighborhoods with higher crime rates. 246 They also make it easier for
parents to place boundaries on their children's activities, since the other
247
youths in the neighborhood have to return home at the same time.
This Note asserts that minors' rights may be restricted more than
those of adults, primarily because the Bellotti factors should be applied in
these situations. 248 Thus, curfews are a proper exercise of the state's
power that present no constitutional issues when properly drafted. 249 If
no constitutional rights are at issue, the level of scrutiny is merely
rational basis, and curfews will likely be upheld under such
250
circumstances.
Cheri L. Lichtensteiger Baden*

Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States:
1994-1996, Curfew,
http://ojjdy.ncjrs.org/pubs/reform/ch2_c.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002). The two most
important factors in the success of curfews are sustained enforcement and community
involvement. Id. Other factors include: enlistment of volunteers to aid in the process;
organization of programs, such as counseling, in place for children while they wait for their
parents to pick them up; establishment of a curfew center to hold children until their
parents can pick them up; creation of a hotline for community questions or problems
relating to juvenile delinquency; and enactment of a curfew that entails specific procedures.
Id.
247
Id.
248
See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the Bellotti factors and the justification for
treating the rights of minors differently than adults.
249
Properly drafted means that the curfew contains clear language and ample exceptions
to ensure that the ordinance is narrowly tailored to meet the state's compelling interest.
250 See supra Part III.C.2.
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